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Full Length Research Paper

Power-sharing and electoral conflict management in Zanzibar: Focusing on electoral institutions

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Zanzibar adopted a power-sharing in 2010 to solve the tumultuous electoral conflict that resulted in bloodshed and social upheaval. In a unique case, the adoption involves a referendum vote and a subsequent constitutional change. The aim was to make the arrangement reliable and stable for peace and democracy on the Island. The expectation, though, fades into obscurity. The public witnessed election violence in 2020, a 2016 election boycott, and various opposition party attempts to end power-sharing. The electoral conflict management theories hold that the institutional capacity to support free, fair, and transparent elections is necessary for managing electoral conflict in any society. This study examines the electoral institution's ability to control electoral conflict with power-sharing in Zanzibar. The study was conducted in Zanzibar and involved a documentary review and in-depth interviews data collection tool. The study found that the electoral institution under power-sharing still does not significantly build trust among the parties. The fairness of the electoral process continues to be demanded by the parties, specifically the opposition. As a result, demands accompanied by chaos and violence emerged. The case of Zanzibar compels a need to create an independent electoral system that operates with integrity, honesty and impartiality.

Key words: Power-sharing, election, electoral conflict, conflict management, institutions, electoral institution.

INTRODUCTION

Since the multiparty system was reinstated in Zanzibar in 1992, there has been tumultuous election-related strife. Every election cycle saw a high number of reported occurrences of killings, injuries, and social unrest (John, 2020). Minde et al. (2018), state that the multiparty system's unadjusted electoral practices caused this tragedy. All competing parties and players in the Zanzibar election have continuously accused each other. During the elections, the incumbent and the opposition parties have questioned the electoral process. This mistrust

generates the demands to ensure a free and fair electoral process through soft and hard power. As a result, Zanzibar's political life is dominated by electoral violence.

In the effort to solve such electoral-related conflict, in 2010, the then two contested political parties' leaders, Amani Abeid Karume of Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and Seif Sharif Hamad of Civic United Front (CUF) declared the agreement to end the pro-long electoral-related conflict in the Island (Bakari and Makulilo, 2022). The understanding of the parties' leaders made the birth

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of Power-sharing, a new governance system. In a unique case, Zanzibar Power-sharing was adopted through referendum and subsequent constitutional change before the 2010 general election. The aim was to stabilize power-sharing to enhance two interconnected goals: stability and democracy. The power-sharing operated for five years before collapsing in 2015. It returned in 2020 after the general election, which records some killings, injuries, and violence as used before the power-sharing (Council of the EU, 2020; Minde, 2021).

The re-emergence of electoral violence in 2020 attracted academic debates on the capacity of power-sharing institutions to manage the pro-long electoral conflict on the Island (Bakari and Makulilo, 2012; John, 2020; Minde et al., 2018). Therefore, this paper analyzes the extent to which power-sharing institutions are set to manage the electoral-related conflict in Zanzibar. The study analyses power-sharing institutions based on the capacity and autonomy of the institutional setup, rules, and regulations.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Power-sharing as an electoral conflict management mechanism

The electoral conflict has attracted local and international attention due to the violent outbreak in many countries. Globally, more than 4,223 cases of deadly electoral conflict have been recorded from 1989 to 2017. Of 4,223 violence cases, 1955 cases were recorded in Africa and 1644 cases in Asia; more cases have increased recently (Fjelde and Ho, 2022). Around sixty percent of all African elections led to conflict, even though only twenty percent caused large-scale causality (Straus and Taylor, 2009). Again, one-fifth of all global elections cause violence (Norris, 2019). The problem's magnitude necessitates local and international stakeholders to find a mechanism for managing the conflict.

Functionally, the electoral conflict is mainly associated with violence, which aims to influence some electoral results. Höglund and Jarstad (2010) mention four categories where actors can use electoral conflict related to violence to influence the outcome. Firstly, the whole election; this means the actor can use violence in any election. Secondly, the actors will violently contest a specific electoral contest. Thirdly, actors accept electoral competition but conduct violence to influence the result. Lastly, the actor uses violence to overturn the proclaimed result. Again, the electoral conflict mainly occurs with time. The conflict before and during the election aims to foster the vote share of the political parties, while those post-electoral conflicts aim to challenge official results (Dunaiski, 2015).

Therefore, conflict management scholars treat electoral violence as the aftermath of defeat in the race. Those

who are defeated become frustrated and sense the need to propel conflicts (Madalina, 2016). Scholars believe that electoral conflict or violence is a "strategic manipulation" used by politicians to shape the election in their favor (Dunaiski, 2015).

At this point, the weaker parties use electoral violence to challenge the result and sometimes to have a slice of the national cake. The stronger party may use electoral violence also to maintain superiority when things change. In this situation, the win-win alternative becomes the most suitable approach. According to Mares and Young (2016) and Collier and Vicente (2012), election-related violence is generated from election irregularities, fraud, and corruption in the electoral process. So, managing electoral conflict must go directly to enhance free and fair elections with quality democracy. These outlooks made the policymakers and political practitioners consider the management of the elections, including the alternative strategy of a win-win mechanism (Höglund and Jarstad, 2010). Power-sharing between the major parties helps to make elections out of violence in this situation.

Thus, power-sharing was introduced as an alternative after the winner-take-all approach seemed to leave large groups outside the leadership system, specifically in a society where political groups match the numbers of followers (Lijphart, 1977, 1969; Wolf, 2018). In the "Winner takes all," "simple majority system," or "first past the post," the candidate wins as long as he gets the highest score of the vote. This means the candidate can win the seat even if they score 51 per cent over 49 per cent of their opponent in the general ballot. Some majority systems involve the win with at least half the score (50%), but others only take the highest score. For instance, in the Turkish presidential election 2023, the Erdogan party- *Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi* (AKP), won 52.18 over 47.82% of his opponent's party (Supreme Election Council, 2023). Thus, the isolated group with related supporters competed with the other synonymous group. So, Power-sharing helps to cool the pressure of the contested groups as all are represented in government institutions.

Zanzibar is not alone, of course, in adopting power sharing to solve the electoral violence. In Lebanon, for example, which also suffered from First Past the Post, the Taif Accords adjusted the rules so that, in any constituency which said 50, 25, 25 between Sunni, Shia, and Maronite, respectively. Every party had to nominate four candidates in the same ratio of 50, 25, and 25 religious affiliations. So, regardless of the party they supported, every voter consistently voted for two Sunnis, one Shia, and one Christian (Calfat, 2018; Salamey, 2009). Papua New Guinea also suffered from majoritarianism because many political parties were tribal. So, to manage the tribal conflict, they adopted the preferential alternative vote, stipulating that, for the vote to be valid, a voice had to consist of at least three preferences. In other words, the voters were asked to

cross the sectarian divide (Kivimaki and Thorning, 2002).

The approach has become more commonly used to solve the erupting electoral violence in Africa. Zimbabwe, Kenya, South Sudan, and, in a unique case, Zanzibar, have been used to solve the erupted electoral violence at different times. Power-sharing increases the chances for popular representation as all segments of society are represented (Bochsler and Juon, 2021). However, it excludes other minority groups, such as women and lower income groups, but these groups belong to a particular ethnic-racial group represented in sharing institutions.

While the approach continues to be adopted in many societies with some success in solving political problems, it is a quietly skeptical question on the effectiveness of enhancing democratic practices in the community (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). Again, in power-sharing, the public is more passive in democratic participation instead of majoritarian. In power-sharing, the elites enter into the negotiation and frontier of the implementation with little consideration of mass (Carboni, 2020). Thus, the re-emergence of electoral conflict continues to be noticed in communities. This is because some institutions are neither established nor designed to promote institutions for free and direct participation. Instead, decision power rested on elites hands. There is a need to have strong institutions that consider people-centered power-sharing as necessary instead of having an elite-project power-sharing design (Bakari and Makulilo, 2022).

Historicizing elections and electoral conflict in Zanzibar

Fiercely competitive elections have characterized Zanzibar since pre-independence to the current multiparty elections. The polls have produced mistrust, political diversity, and a big crack in society. The worst thing about these elections is that they competed with an ethnic and racial base under the umbrella of the political parties (Koenings, 2018; Sheriff, 2001). Neither the colonial multiparty nor post-independence elections solved the ethnic-racial electoral competition in the Isles (Bakari and Makulilo, 2022). The Island continues to experience social exclusion in the name of election competition, where race and region become the tools of those exclusion practices. The works of literature argue that the formation of political parties that compete during the pre and post-independence elections have been formed to fulfill the need for racial and Identity representation in the political activities in Zanzibar (Killian, 2008; Matheson, 2012).

Historically, Zanzibar, a semi-autonomous political entity in the United Republic of Tanzania, conducted four multiparty elections during the colonial period. The first election was in 1957, the second and third were in 1961, and the last in 1963. In all these elections, the parties represented the requirement of related ethnic and regional

identity affiliations. For instance, the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) originated from African and Shirazi natives, mainly from Unguja and Mainlanders. In contrast, Zanzibar and Pemba People Party (ZPPP) and Zanzibar National Party (ZNP) originated from Arab and foreign genesis and were primarily settled in Pemba Island (McMahon, 2012). These identity-affiliated parties were a decent of the economic associations formed in the late 1930s. The Africa Association was created to represent the African and Zanzibar natives' interests. The same associations were the Indian National Association and the Arab Association to safeguard the Indian merchants' class and Arabs' land-owned class, respectively (Throup, 2016). Ethnic-racial parties enter the elections to protect their group's economic interests. This situation formed a heterogeneous pluralistic society where society was divided along the ethno-region base. As a result, the elections become the tools for struggling among the groups' members of the community. The native African-related parties represented the Africans working for independence through elections, while the Arabs and Indian-related parties protected their ownership, colonial supremacy, and status quo (Killian, 2008).

The ethnic-region base of the 1957, 1961, and 1963 elections competed with the purely identity-related parties of ASP, ZNP, and ZPPP. Among the most debatable issues in that election was the electoral process, including the structure of the electoral commission and its functions. The 1957 election was conducted with a sensational motion of voters, whereby most registered voters participated. It constitutes two main political parties, ASP and ZNP, and other minor parties, including the Muslim Dominant Indians Association party. The results made the ASP win five out of the six contested seats. One seat goes to the Muslim-dominated Indians Association party (Sheriff, 2001). This election result made the ZNP party feel defeated by their subordinate as long as the ZNP was the Arab party that favored their land ownership and supremacy (Matheson, 2012).

It was derived from Lasswell's (1936)¹ definition of politics as *who gets what, when, and how*; the Sultanate government under the British protectorate amended the constitution in 1960 to continue holding power. The amendment allows the increase of 22 seats for contestation. However, such centers create claims to the ASP as the constituents favor the ZNP (Bakari, 2005). For instance, the Stone Town area was given two seats with a small size and population, with Makunduchi constituents in Kusini Unguja. Such structural change in the electoral process made the January 1961 election consist of 22 seats with three significant parties: ASP, ZNP, and ZPPP. The ASP won 10 seats, ZNP won 9 chairs, and ZPPP won 3 seats. However, the ZPPP seats

¹ In *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How* (1936)—a work whose title later served as the standard lay definition of politics—he viewed the elite as the primary holders of power.

divide one seat to ASP and two seats to ZNP. This made ASP have 11 seats, as well as ZNP. This result made the re-election of June 1961 to be held in Zanzibar.

The competitive elections with a small margin of votes continue to dominate the Island in each election. In June 1961, the election was conducted to include the same three giant parties: ZPPP, ZNP, and ASP. However, the structural change of the constituent was held to add Mtambile constituents in Pemba. This addition was done purposively to make ZNP get many seats over ASP because ZNP has more support in Pemba than in Unguja (Koenings, 2018). The June election resulted in bloody riots which started in the polling station. This riot continued within a week and caused 68 deaths and 381 injuries. With blood riots, the combination of ZNP and ZPPP won the election by 13 seats over ten seats of ASP. Despite the majority of seats won by ZNP/ZPPP, the ASP won the total vote of 45,172 against 44,092 of the ZPPP/ZNP (Bakari, 2005). This result leaves doubt on the claims of ASP, who argued for the legitimacy of the ZPPP/ZNP government. The turbulent politics continued after the 1961 violent election, where the British government proposed forming a coalition government under Sultanate kingship. The winning Parties of ZPPP and ZNP offered three ministerial posts out of nine to the ASP, but ASP rejected and demanded free and fair elections (Brown, 2010). The search for free and fair elections was the most required aspect of the ASP and its allies. They argued that the British rules and regulations on the elections gave Sultan's parties (ZPPP and ZNP) victory without considering the majority of the vote won by African native support (Throup, 2016). What is noticed was the continuity of colonial politics through ballots.

Again, in 1963, Zanzibar conducted an election that was named to be an independence election. The election comes after the amendment of the constitution to allow the division of Zanzibar into 31 constituents. Moreover, this election was termed the pick point of self-government by abolishing the colonial acquisition. As for all previous elections, the ASP party, which many African natives supported, won the majority votes by 54.3%, while ZNP fell by 29.8%. However, the seats won by ASP were 13, while the alliance of ZPPP and ZNP was 18 seats (Ali, 2013). With those results, the coalition formed a government and gained independence on 10 December 1963. Majoritarian ASPs and their allies did not recognize such independence, arguing that the ASP votes were more than other party votes. These phenomena resulted in the bloodshed of the Revolution, which marks the current society's political division between those who agreed with the 1963 independence and those who agreed with the 1964 revolution. As a result, The main political parties that participated in the 1995 election were decent of the previous pre-independence parties (Haji, 2023; Matheson, 2012; Mukangara, 2000).

The 1963 Independence and 1964 Revolution marked the end of the colonial period in Zanzibar. The self-

governed government was formulated on 12 January 1964, where the Afro Shiraz Party led the government in a mono-party system. At that time, one party ruled the country where the previous opposition parties were suppressed, and some of their leaders flew outside the country. On 5 February 1977, the ASP was united with Tanganyika Africa National Union (TANU), a party on the other side of the United Republic of Tanzania, to make CCM. This unification gave power to the former ASP and completed the burial of the ZNP and ZPPP political parties, though their believers were exited.

The new wave of democratization in the 1990s aimed at increasing democracy through fair elections, transparency, accountability, and the rule of law (Markoff, 2015). In Zanzibar, such an assumption seems to be far from being reached. The multiparty system, which began in 1992, awakened Zanzibar's pre- and post-independence political practices. The multiparty system became a revenge tool for the defeat of the 1964 revolution in Zanzibar. The pre-independence election tragedy continued during the post-multiparty elections that began in 1995. The political parties contested during the colonial periods seem to represent the current political parties. The main contested political party, Civic United Front (CUF), primarily represents the local Arabs and natives of Pemba, and Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) represents the Unguja natives and Mainlanders (Longman, 2013). These current party genes reflect the previous parties of the ZNP and ASP parties. As a result, identity contestation via political parties continues in the new era of multiparty elections. The 1995, 2000, and 2005 election results clearly show that Pemba Island is the base of the opposition casting all seats. Such opposition nature to the CCM, the ruling party, made Pemba suffocate from political and economic exclusion (Killian, 2008). Such exclusion influences the Pemba native struggle for economic and political equality. As a result, Pemba natives became the most affected area of electoral violence. For instance, in 2001, the electoral conflict caused many deaths, injuries, and displacement (Nassor and Jose, 2014).

Concerning election violence in every general election and the small margin between the two big parties (CCM and CUF) in the 1995, 2000, and 2005 elections, the idea of forming a power-sharing government becomes necessary. However, what comes to the head of people, including scholars, is the ability of the power-sharing electoral institutions to solve the electoral problems on the Island. Such an argument comes as a reflection of the failure of the previous institutions to utterly provide mutual trust among the contending parties and citizens at large (Roop et al., 2018). Again, another question was about Zanzibar's political culture and the sharing of government political posts. Previously, the literature tells us there was weak political trust and tolerance among the parties' elites and citizens (John, 2020). This provides the challenges for the formed power-sharing electoral institutions to solve the pro-long electoral conflict.

DATA AND METHODS

The study needs to understand how the electoral institution is arranged and functions to hold the ethos of electoral conflict in Zanzibar. Thus, it needs to analyze the election's setting, rules, and regulations and understand how the electoral body performs its duty. Therefore, this study requires the review and analysis of rules and regulations of the election formulated after the power sharing. Thus, the review of documents such as constitution of 2010, the Zanzibar Referendum Act of 2010, the Zanzibar Electoral Commission Act of 2010 and 2018, and the parties' official records from 2010 to 2022. These documents are rich to provide how electoral institution is set and works.

To understand the performance of the electoral institution under power-sharing, this study selects respondents who were involved in the formulation and implementation of power-sharing arrangements to gather their experiences and opinions. The respondents include politicians from both the ruling party, CCM, and the opposition party, ACT Wazalendo, with equal numbers to prevent political bias. These respondents include leaders of power sharing government, political elites and the government officials. Citizens are the most affected group of electoral violence and they are the one who accept power sharing in 2010 with the expectation that it will cure the problem. Thus citizens opinion and comment concerning with the performance of electoral institution after power sharing is very important. This study opt respondents from three districts namely; Mjini, Micheweni, and Kusini to participate in interview. These districts were chosen explicitly because they politically had a memorable experience. Micheweni represents the strong opposition base. Kusini represents a ruling party base, while Mjini is a fifty-fifty of the ruling and opposition base. The total sample of 28 respondents was included.

The respondents were interviewed to get the understanding on the performance of electoral institutions include how the power-sharing institutions of Zanzibar operate, (ZEC and House of the Representatives). Thematic analysis was used to analyze data starting from sorting data, coding and generalized data to answer the respected question. All respondents from all categories were assigned codes based on their unique positions rather than their names, preserving the anonymity and safety of the respondents.

FINDINGS

Capacity and autonomy of the electoral institutions, rules and regulations

This part of the study examines the capacity and ability of the electoral institution to uphold the problem of legitimacy and non-credibility of the vote. The result of this study shows that for ten years of its operation, power-sharing has been unable to exercise elections without violence in Zanzibar. The institutional arrangement did not fill the thirst for electoral integrity in Zanzibar. Electoral institutions are highly dependent on the decisions of the top hierarchy of the incumbent party and not through negotiations. The institutions that depend highly on the rules to produce a high electoral standard are criticized for being biased and calculative. As a result, unequal treatment among the sharing parties developed and, hence, mistrust. This study seems to continue the previous political practices on the election in the current politics in Zanzibar.

Structurally, Zanzibar power-sharing adopts the National

Unity governance model, where the two winning political parties share power in the government institutions. Section 9 of the Zanzibar constitution provides the structure of the Zanzibar government. It reveals that the Zanzibar government will be National Unity to foster unity and democracy.

*"The structure of the Zanzibar government will be in the form of national unity, and its function will be to ensure unity and democracy is enhanced."*²

The Government of National Unity (GNU) consists of two political parties that win the majority vote or seats in the general election. Section 39 (1, 2, and 3) of the constitution provides the procedures that the first and second winner parties share power in the GNU. The section stipulated that;

*"After the seven days of appointment, the President will appoint the First and Second Vice President..., the first vice President comes from the second winner party and the second vice President comes from the winner party..... Except if the second winning party boycotts the government, then the First Vice President post will be given to the other second opposition party on the seat of the House of Representatives (HoRZ)."*³

Again, section 42 (2) provides the procedure for Ministerial post selection. The selection of Ministers depends on the number of seats each of the two big parties got in the general election.

*The President, within fourteen days immediately after appointing the First Vice President and the Second Vice President, in consultation with all Vice Presidents, will appoint Ministers from among the Members of the House of Representatives based on the ratio of seats in the states to the political parties in the House of Representatives."*⁴

This means that the election is the base of power-sharing in Zanzibar. If that is the case, a fair electoral process is essential to avoid fiercely competitive elections. This means that the functionality of power-sharing in Zanzibar will depend on how much it solves the electoral problems, including transparency in the electoral process and equal treatment of the party.

In tackling the mistrust and claim of secrecy on the electoral process, the electoral body of the Government of National Unity of Zanzibar involved two big parties (ruling and opposition) in the electoral commission. Section 119 (1) (b) and Section 119 (1) (c) said;

"...Two members will be selected by the President from

² Translation of Zanzibar constitution from Swahili language

³ Translation of Zanzibar constitution from Swahili language

⁴ Translation of Zanzibar constitution from Swahili language

*the leader of the government in the House of Representatives and two members under the recommendation of the opposition party....*⁵

Including the two giant parties' members in the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) provides the outer cover of how the power-sharing of Zanzibar is inclusive. Thus, it was expected to cure the non-transparency of the ZEC and, hence, cure mistrust. However, the question remains whether this commission arrangement is enough and capable of solving the electoral problem.

Drawing from the electoral body set, which includes members from the opposition, this study found the imbalance of the members in ZEC. Adding two opposition members to ZEC does not add value to establishing equality and justice in the electoral process as long as the majoritarian decision remains centred on the party (ruling party), which, by principle, has a majority of members in ZEC. Section 119 (1) said

"... (a) Chairman will be selected by the President using his desired procure.

(b) The President will select two members from the leader of the government duty in the House of Representatives

(c) The President will select two members under the recommendation of the opposition party in the House of Representation

(d) One member of the High Court judge

*(e) The President will select one member as he wishes....*⁶

The head of decision in ZEC is a chairman, directly appointed by the President. Technically, only two of the remaining six appointed members are from the opposition. Only two members in section 119 (1) (c) allow the President to set two members with consultation from the opposition party. The President chooses the remaining members without being obligated to seek consensus from the opposition party. This means the President will appoint the remaining members to favour him and his party. Consequently, the opposition party feels to be a minority in ZEC. The interview by the member of the reconciliation committee denotes;

*"....There are no differences in the electoral process except the inclusion of the two members from the opposition. If you look at the ZEC structure, you will find that the decision-making is set to favor the ruling party. With this situation, do you think ZEC will make a fair decision...?"*⁷

From the structure of the ZEC, the unbalanced situation of the members of the ZEC indicates that power-sharing

⁵ Translation of Zanzibar constitution from Swahili language

⁶ Translation of Zanzibar constitution from Swahili language

⁷ The interview by a member of reconciliation committee from opposition 16/12/2021

was not aimed at solving the ZEC mistrust claimed by the political parties since 1995. Instead, the ZEC controlled and worked under the influence of one side's interests, which is a majority in the ZEC. This made the ZEC have less autonomy in exercising its work. In the interview, one of the political activists commented that

*"...The main problem is not about including the opposition member in the electoral commission; the problem is the lack of freedom of the electoral commission in exercising its work. Still, the ruling party handles the commission's rules and functions. The President appoints all-important top staff in the commission, including the Chairman and four commissioners out of six. So, how the fairness of the commission could be reached....?"*⁸

As part of the appointment of the commissions of the ZEC, the daily operation and functions of the commission include drafting the electoral regulations, constituents' boundaries, voters' registration, and education of the director of the commission. This entire task is done by the director and his staff, whom the President of Zanzibar also appoints. Section 13 of the act of the ZEC establishment in 2017 gives the President power to appoint the Director of ZEC. This director's appointment mode has already evoked many questions on the fairness of the director's function in the electoral commission. On 10 November 2022, the President of Zanzibar, through his authority, re-appoints Mr. Idarous Faina to be the director of the ZEC. This appointment caused a misunderstanding in the GNU after the opposition party opposed the designation. The opposition party wrote a letter to the President opposing the appointment of Faina. The letter titled "ACT Wazalendo Yapinga Uteuzi wa Ndugu Thabit Idarous Faina kua Mkurugenzi Wa Tume Ya Uchaguzi Zanzibar," which is translated as "ACT Wazalendo Opposes the Appointment of Thabit Faina to Become a Director of ZEC" was written on the same day of the appointment to the President.

This claim is the continuation of the mistrust of the commission by the opposition following the result of the 2020 general election under the same director. The opposition claims that Faina alleged the result to favor the ruling party, whereas the opposition got 19.87% of the vote only. This result is far contrary to the previous results, where the margin of the vote between the opposition and ruling parties was minimal (fifty by fifty). This situation indicates that the mode of selection of the member of the ZEC is not healthy for managing electoral violence because it leaves the parties not trust to the ZEC staff and method of choice.

Apart from the biased structural arrangement of the electoral body, the decision is not by consensus among the sharing parties but rather by a majority decision. This

⁸ The interview by a member of reconciliation committee from opposition, 9/12/2021

type of decision of the commission is made by the majority members, which is by structure, obviously will be the ruling party wins the decision in the commission. Section 119 (10) of the constitution said that,

*"The ratio of the ZEC meeting will be of Chairman or Vice-chairman and four members; each commission decision must be supported by a majoritarian."*⁹

The majority decision in the electoral commission gives majority power to the ruling party and automatically leaves the opposition party powerless in ZEC. This made all ruling party agendas pass in ZEC. For instance, the early voting bill in Zanzibar was carried out through majority decisions in the cabinet but was highly opposed by the opposition parties. The opposition claimed that allowing early voting in Zanzibar would lead to vote rigging and other malpractices. This situation erupted violently during the early vote day in 2020 as the opposition party motivated their followers to go to the polling station. This created mistrust, and the opposition followers rallied to oppose the election results. As a result, the state forces used firearms to control the protest and caused some killings and injuries. This situation was due to the majoritarian decision within power-sharing. Once it was a consensus decision, the opposition could not protest the early voting practices.

Again, the majority decision decreases the value and integrity of power-sharing as long as one side's decision becomes the rule. This situation also affects political activities, including the election, which is the source of the problem in Zanzibar. For instance, the result annulment in 2015 was due to the majority decision of ZEC. The then commissioner of ZEC, Jecha Salim Jecha, used the majority decision in the commission to terminate the result. Consequently, the opposition boycotted the GNU. The opposition and international observers highly claimed the termination of the announcement of the election results. They argued that the Chairman had done it purposively to give the President's party a victory. Once a time, the head of the opposition party used to say that;

*"... The Chairman does what the top hierarchy of CCM assigned him. The system decided to annul the result because it was in opposition favor...."*¹⁰

Despite many claims from witnesses from different angles on the weaknesses of the rules and decision, especially in the 2015 election result termination, the principle adhered to the constitution of power-sharing seems innocent. The constitution remains clear and calm in what is happening because it was stated. For instance, the CCM followers support the Chairman's action of vote termination as prescribed in the rules and regulations.

The interview with the former ZEC chairman denotes;

*"... Terminating the results in 2015 followed all the processes and was a ZEC decision. The Chairman himself cannot alone cancel the result without majority acceptance. So, the ZEC rules and regulations canceled the result, not Jecha...."*¹¹

The chairman stand was also supported by the top former GNU leader from the CCM party as he denotes;

*"... The ZEC works independently, and even the President cannot interfere with its operation. The opposition will always comment negatively on the electoral commission until they get a victory. This is the nature of opposition we have...."*¹²

The interpretations of the above comments indicate that the reality of the ZEC operations and functions is defined through political affiliation. This study found that most claims about the electoral procedures and process come from the opposition side. What is noticed is that the ruling party is fabulous with ZEC as it gives results that favour them. This finding is compiled with the study of Wall et al. (2014), which assert that; "In many but not all cases of disputed elections, a major complaint is that the electoral commission is somehow or other operating in the interests of the ruling party." This situation contradicts the principle of electoral integrity, where the electoral commission is purposed to be non-partisan, and its decision does not benefit any political party. Again, the selection of the Chairman and commissions of the ZEC by the President, who is from the ruling class, gives some doubt to the fairness of the results.

Consequently, the opposition did not believe in the trueness of the result in every election despite including their members in ZEC. This situation leaves the previous danger of eruption of violence as the opposition followers reject the ZEC result. A typical example was in the 2020 election, the head of Opposition from ACT Wazalendo, Seif Sharif Hamad, organized a rally to oppose the election result. This resulted in the eruption of violence, where several citizens were injured, and some death was noticed.

Despite the electoral institution's structural and operational weaknesses, the rules claim to be independent and perform their operation without interference. Section 119 (12) stipulated that;

*"In performing its duty according to this constitution, ZEC will not be obligated to follow any command from the person, institution, and political party."*¹³

The above section gives autonomy to the ZEC to perform

⁹ Translation of Zanzibar constitution from Swahili language

¹⁰ The press release by the Secretary General of CUF: 26th October, 2015

¹¹ The interview by the former chairman of the ZEC, 28/11/2021

¹² The interview by the top GNU opposition leader, 23/10/2021

¹³ Translation of Zanzibar constitution from Swahili language

its duty independently. However, in the practical sense, it is challenging for the appointees of the President to work independently without being influenced by his party's decision.

The electoral process in Zanzibar includes many stakeholders; a part of ZEC includes municipal directors, Police, and other forces for peace mission on election days. All these stakeholders are appointed or commanded by the President in their daily activities and during the operation. This made the electoral process challenging, and no transparency could be maintained. The Interviews by the top leader of the GNU from the opposition commented;

"... Nobody couldn't thank his boss who appointed him and assigned a task. How could you expect the ZEC and other electoral institutions to be independent while his staff is directly appointed by the President and tasked...?"¹⁴

The electoral institution's structure and function in power-sharing did not provide the trust of free and fair elections. What is noticed is the continuation of the electoral practices that decreases the electoral credibility and integrity. It has been witnessed that the voting process leaves many eligible voters out of voting. The electoral process in Zanzibar continues to go claims to the opposition party whereby the process begins by acquiring the Zanzibar Residential Identity Card (Zan ID)—the letter for that letter obtained from Sheha, who the Regional Commission appoints. To a large extent, they serve the incumbent party. This made a lot of eligible voters out of the voting process. In the interview, one of the citizens in Micheweni commented that during the election of 2020, a lot of eligible citizens claimed that they did not vote because of the process of acquiring a ZAN ID.

"...I wonder what was negotiated and agreed upon in 2010. Here in Pemba, a lot of citizens did not vote in 2020. It wasn't easy to get the vote identity because the process starts with getting the letter from Sheha¹⁵ to identify you as a Shehia resident. After that, you must go to the District office to get the Zan ID¹⁶. After that, you have to wait for ZEC to register in the voters' permanent registration book for valid voters. If you see the process begins from the Shehas; these officers are the ruling party's puppet and are purposively set to make numbers of opposition voters low...."¹⁷

The above interview shows the lengthy procedure set for citizens in Zanzibar to vote. This situation made citizens

not trust the electoral process after power-sharing. They argued that the power-sharing setup and regulation continue previous electoral practices with the new system. The ZEC, with government officials, is the one who controls the whole process without consensus from the political parties. This indicates that as power-sharing has been more than ten years, the electoral process's integrity is still questionable.

DISCUSSION

The study was set to examine the electoral institution under power-sharing and its capability of managing conflict in Zanzibar. The electoral institutions are vital in managing competition and maintaining peace and stability. First, the institution creates rules and regulations regulating political elites' behaviors and interests in the shared institution. In the shared institution, each party wants its interest to be fulfilled. Second, the institutions create rules and regulations that maintain equality and fairness in the electoral process. In the case of Zanzibar, we cannot plausibly be proud of the institutional performance in the two tasks mentioned. The only thing that Zanzibar power-sharing could be proud of in the electoral process is the inclusion of an opposition party in the electoral body (ZEC). The findings of this study show that despite the electoral institution being shared, the incumbent's party interest seems to be much concerned. Primarily, the institutions function on behalf of the incumbent party—electoral rules and regulations set to make the ruling party favored in the electoral process.

Again, this study found that, despite the firm establishment of power-sharing in Zanzibar through negotiation, referendum, and subsequent constitutional change, its institutions don't reflect the need to support free and fair elections. This is because power-sharing functions through majoritarian decisions instead of consensus, as argued by power-sharing principles. The institutions remain ambiguous and dominated by one side of the power-sharing actor. As a result, one side's decision created mistrust in the other side. It made the opposition to power-sharing continue to protest and demand electoral integrity as they used before power-sharing. Again, the study found that the rules and regulations are calculative; they did not enhance the conduct of elections with fairness; instead, they were used as another vehicle for electoral fraud and manipulation. As a result, no changes were noticed in the election after power-sharing regarding quality elections and democracy.

The future of electoral conflict in Zanzibar remains unclear with these institutions' rules and regulations of elections. The findings reveal that power-sharing does not play a significant role in solving electoral disputes on its own; it depends on the elites' willingness to practice democratic norms and reform the institution to uphold the duality of parties in power-sharing. Institutional setup and

¹⁴ The interview by the top GNU opposition leader, 23/10/2021

¹⁵ A Sheha is a lowest hierarchy leader appointed by the President to lead a village.

¹⁶ Zan-ID means Zanzibar Residential Identity; it is an identity to identify the Zanzibaris who resides in Zanzibar within a period of time.

¹⁷ The interview by a citizen in Micheweni district, 29/11/2021

electoral conduct should harmonize for transparency and equal treatment among the shared parties. The institutions must be set so that, regardless of the majority or minority in the electoral institutions, all participating parties have the authority to make decisions. It is advised that ZEC operate on its own. To do this, the commission should be separated from the President's appointment process. All positions should instead compete on their merits. This will help keep commissioners and other staff members more independent from the President's nomination and directives. Once more, adding a veto vote to the election process will aid in reaching a unanimous conclusion rather than a majoritarian one. The veto vote strengthens the decision reached by general agreement, which is essential for expanding power sharing and preventing voter mistrust.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The authors have not declared any conflict of interests.

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Review

International policy coups d'état in Francophone African countries causes, consequences and international responses

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This article examines recent coups d'état in Francophone African countries, including Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, and explores their causes, implications and international responses. To fully understand these events, the article begins by contextualizing the independence of these nations and their complex relationships with France. In the 1950s, France granted independence to its African colonies but established comprehensive cooperation agreements that included military, educational, cultural and economic. These agreements resulted in commitments by African nations to cede natural resources to France and allow the presence of its armed forces in their territories. Furthermore, they established French as the official language in many of these countries. Recently, these nations have faced coups d'état that disrupted their democratic paths. Causes include corruption, political instability, economic discontent and security challenges. There was also a rise in populism and a growing desire for autonomy from French influence, with expulsions of French troops and the search for alliances with Russia. The article takes a detailed look at the causes of these coups, including concerns about corruption, economic performance, and security. Additionally, it explores the political and economic implications of these coups, including the regional and international sanctions applied in response. The complex issue of neocolonialism is also addressed, as these nations seek to redefine their relationships with France and other international actors. The article concludes by highlighting the importance of evolving geopolitical dynamics in Francophone Africa and their implications for international relations. This study offers an in-depth analysis of the political, economic and social transformations underway in the region.

Key words: Coup d'état, independence, sovereignty, Francophone Africa.

INTRODUCTION

Recent events in several nations in Francophone Africa have been marked by political unrest, with a series of coups d'état interrupting the democratic paths that these countries have achieved since the 1990s. These coups,

which took place in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, raise profound questions about their underlying causes, implications and international responses. This article seeks to analyze and understand the factors that

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contributed to these coups d'état and the complex political, economic and social dynamics unfolding in the region.

To fully understand these events, it is crucial to examine the historical context that led to the independence of these Francophone nations and the establishment of complex relations with France. During the 1950s, the African continent witnessed rising anti-imperialist movements, with many colonies fervently seeking their independence. In this scenario, France, shaken by the repercussions of the Second World War, made the decision to grant independence to its African colonies, starting in 1959. However, the granting of independence came with comprehensive cooperation agreements, which included areas such as military, educational, cultural and economic.

These cooperation agreements between France and French-speaking African nations led to a number of implications, including the commitment of these nations to cede part of their natural resources to France and to allow the presence of French armed forces in their territories. Furthermore, the cooperation agreements also established French as the official language in many of these countries, reflecting France's continued influence and deliberate efforts at linguistic and cultural expansion in these territories.

However, recently, these countries have faced a wave of coups d'état that have interrupted the democratic paths they had followed in recent decades. The causes of these coups are multifaceted and include concerns about corruption, political instability, discontent with economic performance and persistent security challenges.

Furthermore, a notable trend has been the rise of populism and the search for greater autonomy from French influence, symbolized by the expulsion of French troops and the search for alliances with Russia.

This article will examine in detail the causes of these coups d'état, the political and economic implications that resulted from these events, and the international responses, including sanctions imposed by regional organizations and the international community.

Additionally, the complex issue of neocolonialism will be discussed, as these nations seek to redefine their relationships with France and other international actors.

In the context of the political, economic and social transformations underway in Francophone Africa, this article seeks to shed light on the geopolitical dynamics and aspirations of these nations in search of greater independence and diversification of alliances. By analyzing the causes, consequences and responses to recent coups d'état, we aim to contribute to a deeper understanding of political developments in the region and their implications for international relations.

METHODOLOGY

Our research into the independence of Francophone

nations in Africa and its implications has taken a meticulous, multidisciplinary approach, incorporating diverse sources and strategies to provide a comprehensive analysis. Initially, we conducted a comprehensive review of historical literature, exploring archival documents, historical testimonies, and works by renowned historians, laying a solid foundation for understanding the historical context of African nations during the colonial period and struggles for independence. A detailed analysis of the cooperation agreements between France and its former African colonies was carried out, examining the implications of these agreements for the sovereignty and development of these nations. Additionally, we delve deeper into recent coups d'état in French-speaking African countries such as Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, analyzing news sources, political speeches, and international relations experts to understand the factors underlying these events. The geopolitical implications of these coups was also assessed, considering their impact on international relations and the dynamics between these African countries, France, the European Union, the United Nations and other global actors. From this collected data, we construct a cohesive narrative spanning from the historical events of the struggle for independence to the contemporary challenges faced by these nations, providing a complete and informed understanding of these processes over time.

THE PROCESS OF INDEPENDENCE OF FRANCOPHONE NATIONS IN AFRICA (ROLE OF FRANCE IN OBTAINING INDEPENDENCE)

To comprehensively address the origins and underlying factors contributing to the state of judicial systems in French-speaking African countries like Benin, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Chad, and others, it is imperative to delve into their historical contexts. By doing so, we can gain a deeper understanding of how these nations attained their independence.

It is extremely important to analyze the independence process to understand how these countries became francophone nations. When we mention French-speaking Africa, we are often faced with the question of how these countries adopted French as an official language.

Francophone Africa encompasses several countries, such as Benin, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Chad, among others, which were subjugated by French colonization. During the 1950s, Africa witnessed the rise of anti-imperialist movements, with many colonies fervently seeking their independence. In this context, France, shaken by the repercussions of the Second World War, with the aim of not losing its influence in Africa, took the decision to grant independence to its African colonies, starting in 1959, under the leadership of President Charles de Gaulle (Presidential term: January

8, 1959 to April 28, 1969).

However, for each colony to conquer its autonomy in a peaceful way, cooperation agreements were signed that covered several areas, such as military, educational, cultural and economic. Such agreements are recorded in the work of Maurice Ligot, entitled "*Cooperation agreements between France and French-speaking African and Malagasy countries.*"

Essentially, these nations agreed to cede a portion of their natural resources to France and to allow the presence of French armed forces in their territories, on an indefinite basis, as part of these cooperation agreements Ligot (1964).

The means provided by cooperation agreements

*"In the agreements concluded with the other States, it is foreseen that they consult on a permanent basis on defense problems with France."*¹

In addition to the previously mentioned agreements, cultural cooperation treaties were also established in which France expressed its intention to promote its language and culture in the territories in question. These agreements were drawn up with the aim of enhancing French culture and language. As a result, many African countries now have French as their official language, reflecting France's continued influence and deliberate efforts at linguistic and cultural expansion in these territories. This linguistic strategy, known as "soft power," continues to be a strategic basis implemented in these countries to this day.

Quoting *Musa Anter (1920 to 1992)*, a Kurdish writer born in Turkey, we can reflect on how language plays a fundamental role in the cultural identity and stability of a State. The quote suggests that the imposition of a foreign language can be seen as a form of domination, indicating that the state was built on the land and culture of those whose language is being destabilized. This perspective highlights the importance of cultural and linguistic issues in geopolitical dynamics and international relations.

Cooperation agreements between France and the French-speaking African and French-speaking Malagasy countries (Ligot, 1964:42).

Cultural cooperation agreements

*These agreements are of extreme importance: They condition the maintenance and expansion of the French language and culture in Black Africa, as well as the development...*²

¹ Cooperation agreements between France and French-speaking African and French-speaking Malagasy countries." 1964, p.4

² Cooperation agreements between France and French-speaking African and French-speaking Malagasy countries. Page 42,1964.

These agreements were signed in a context where these nations felt compelled to do so, as they were in a position of significant disadvantage. An analogy can be made with the situation in France where an armed individual confronts an unarmed civilian with the intention of stealing. In this scenario, the civilian, without means of defense, faces the difficult choice between surrendering his belongings to avoid risks to his life or risking everything.

Likewise, these African nations, without resources to defend themselves, found themselves pressured to accept the terms of these cooperation agreements with France, which implied the transfer of resources and the French military presence in their territories, in order to avoid conflicts or other unfavorable consequences.

CAUSES OF COUPS D'ÉTATS

Corruption, political instability, and coups in African nations: A nuanced examination

In recent years, the African continent has witnessed a series of coups d'état, with emphasis on the occurrence of these events in countries that maintain cooperation agreements with France. This succession of coups has raised questions about its underlying causes and motivations. In the last four years, nations such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have been the scene of coups that have interrupted the democratic paths conquered since the 1990s. These events have raised concerns both among countries in the region and among foreign powers that have strategic interests in Africa.

The quote attributed to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) and Hope (2000) "*Corruption is not when the government steals from you. Corruption is when they stop stealing from you because you paid a bribe,*" succinctly captures the essence of systemic corruption prevalent in many countries, particularly those where the integrity of government and public institutions is compromised. In this article, we will delve into and provide a nuanced argument on this statement. Corruption is a pervasive societal ill with multifaceted detrimental impacts. It manifests diversely, encompassing embezzlement of public resources and the offering of illicit payments, such as bribes and kickbacks, to secure basic services or unfair advantages. Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie's quote serves to underscore the subtlety and perniciousness of the latter form of corruption, where transgressions are less overt yet equally corrosive.

In numerous nations, regrettably, it is a prevalent phenomenon for citizens to find themselves compelled to offer bribes to public officials to access services and entitlements that are rightfully theirs under the law. This predicament extends across sectors such as healthcare, education, the judicial system, and even mundane undertakings like procuring a driver's license or business

permit. This corrupt *modus operandi* not only erodes trust in government institutions but also engenders a society wherein the attainment of justice and public services becomes contorted by the omnipotence of financial incentives. In some countries, it is common for patients to have to pay bribes to doctors, nurses, and hospital staff to receive proper and timely medical treatment. For instance, a patient in need of surgery may be forced to pay a bribe to ensure that their procedure is performed without delays.

This undermines trust in healthcare institutions, jeopardizes lives, and perpetuates inequality in access to healthcare services.

Therefore, Hope (2000) quotation incites contemplation about the intricate nature of corruption, extending beyond the mere misappropriation of public funds. It accentuates the significance of acknowledging and combating systemic corruption, wherein under-the-table dealings are covertly institutionalized, subverting the ethos of fairness, transparency, and equitable governance that should underpin society's foundations. Addressing this form of corruption necessitates not only the enactment of more stringent legal frameworks but also the cultivation of a cultural shift that champions transparency, accountability, and justice at all echelons of society. From this vantage point, it is readily apparent that corruption remains a deeply entrenched issue within the governments of African nations, with Niger and Mali being notable examples. This pervasive corruption may very well serve as a pivotal factor contributing to the recurrent coups witnessed in these regions.

Also, we discovered other more important factors that perhaps provoked this coup d'état in Niger recently. Firstly, discontent with Bazoum's government was driven by a number of critical issues. The Nigerien population has expressed growing concern about the country's economic performance, as many have faced economic hardship. Furthermore, the management of the COVID-19 pandemic generated controversies, with questions about the measures adopted and the distribution of resources to combat the health crisis. There has also been criticism regarding internal security, as Niger has faced significant security challenges due to the presence of terrorist and insurgent groups in various parts of the country.

Mali has experienced political instability in previous years, including a military coup in 2020 that ousted then-president Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. This history of political instability created an environment ripe for future coups, as trust in democratic institutions had been eroded.

Mamdani (2018) and Barclay (2012) in their articles, explores how contemporary coups d'état can be understood as a reflection of the colonial legacies that persist in the governance of Mali and other African nations.

Furthermore, following the 2020 coup, a transitional government was established to lead the country until

elections. However, this transitional government has faced significant criticism, including a lack of progress on political reforms and resolving the problems that led to the previous coup. Dissatisfaction with the transitional government and perceived ineffectiveness contributed to political unrest in the country.

Another important factor was the continued security threat in Mali, including the presence of terrorist groups such as jihadists. These persistent security challenges have created an environment of insecurity and fear among the population, fueling dissatisfaction and the search for alternative solutions to deal with this threat.

Political and geopolitical dynamics in West Africa: Reflections on recent coups and searches for autonomy

The independence granted to these countries was conditioned by certain terms. In defense cooperation agreements, France established that the continued presence of its military troops was necessary to protect its own interests. Since the 1960s, France has carried out more than 40 military interventions. Douglas Yates explain in his work about the interventions, consequences, objectives of these French military interventions in its former African colonies. According to the terms of these agreements, the French armed forces have the right to free transit through these territories, and in the event of intervention, these countries are obligated to provide their resources to support French military operations in defense of shared interests (Ligot, 1964).

"The French army is thus recognized as having the right to circulate freely in the territory of the signatory States, as well as in their airspace and their territorial waters, to use all their port, railway, road and air infrastructure and the post and telecommunications networks..."³

In the signed agreements, France clearly establishes provisions that, when these countries have products or resources available for trade, they are expected to first consider offering these opportunities to France, granting it priority over potential competitors. Additionally, when these African nations require goods and services, they are inclined to favor options of French origin before exploring alternatives in other markets. Furthermore, these nations are also tasked with providing infrastructure for the storage of products, materials, and resources that may be utilized by the French armed forces. This includes the provision of storage facilities, warehouses, and other essential structures to support France's military activities in these regions (Ebaye, 2010; Englebert,

³ Cooperation agreements between France and French-speaking African and French-speaking Malagasy countries., published in 1964, on page 8.

2009).

Upon analysis, it becomes apparent that these countries encounter significant limitations in terms of controlling their territories, resources, and the ability to make independent decisions to a considerable extent.

This situation raises questions about the extent of their sovereignty. In the realm of international relations, sovereignty holds a pivotal role, allowing nations like Brazil to autonomously determine what serves the best interests of their territories and populations and, when deemed necessary, to sever ties with other states. Sovereignty is a principle revered by several political philosophers, including Rousseau (1987), for its critical role in ensuring that a state can fully assert control over its national interests.

In summary, sovereignty stands as a fundamental principle that empowers nations to shape their own destinies. It encompasses self-determination, independence, internal governance, the safeguarding of national interests, the promotion of peace, participation in international relations, and respect for cultural diversity. Sovereignty is a foundational element in international relations, assuring that states can steer their own course without unwarranted interference from external parties.

Nevertheless, in the midst of the 21st century, in a world that has witnessed the expansion of democracy and where the majority of states exercise their political autonomy to shape their futures, there are still nations grappling with forms of neocolonialism. Many of the former French colonies in Africa, as noted by various scholars, maintain deep ties with the French imperialist system, raising questions about their genuine independence and sovereignty.

However, on January 18, 2021, the transitional government announced the dissolution of the CNSP, albeit almost four months after the initial agreement that pledged its dissolution. Subsequently, the constitution underwent no alterations, with the new Magna Carta, enacted on July 22, altering the status of French from an official language (which had been in place since Mali's independence in 1960) to a working language.

In this context, it is worth noting that one of the initial actions following the coup was the termination of the cultural cooperation agreement with France, which included the status of the French language in Mali. Additionally, the military junta severed defense cooperation agreements with France, citing "flagrant violations of Malian sovereignty." This decision garnered support from proponents of closer ties with Russia (Cooper, 1996).

In summary, the coup d'état in Mali reflects a discernible aspiration on the part of the country to reclaim its sovereignty following a sense of discontent arising from perceived violations of agreements with France and a perception of exploitation by this former colonial power. This event serves as an illustration of the intricate political dynamics and international relations within the African region (EURO NEWS, 2022).

A recurring trend in these events is the emergence of populism, where emerging leaders adopt a nationalist stance and position themselves as champions of national interests, garnering the support of their fellow citizens. This includes adopting an anti-French stance, symbolized by the expulsion of French military troops and calls for the French ambassador to return to their home country. Furthermore, these countries have received support from Russia, which is noteworthy as it signifies a growing inclination towards forging alliances with Russia over France. This suggests a deepening sense of discontent with France, which could be characterized as a rising sentiment of frustration towards this former colonial power (Siegle, 2021).

In the first image, a photograph can be seen depicting President Putin being displayed in the hands of Nigerien citizens, indicating the people's support for cooperation with Russia (Figure 1). While the second image comes across a message of great impact written as " *France gets out* ", denoting a demonstration in favor of the withdrawal of French military forces from the country (Figure 2).

It was also noted that the population has shown support for the military in this endeavor in search of the withdrawal of French troops from the country. This popular support is evidence of widespread discontent in relation to the foreign military presence and reflects the collective will to seek the country's sovereignty and autonomy.

As for the coup in Niger, which took place on July 26, 2023, it involved the detention of President Mohamed Bazoum by the presidential guard and the proclamation of General Abdourahamane Tchiani as leader of a military junta. The country's borders were closed, state institutions were suspended, and a curfew was implemented.

Niger is notable for being the seventh largest supplier of uranium in the world and one of the main suppliers of this resource to French nuclear power plants. Although it plays a critical role in uranium supply to France, access to electricity in Niger is limited, with only 18.6% of the population having access, compared to France where virtually the entire population has electricity (Tables 1 and 2).

These events in West Africa reflect not only discontent regarding French influence, but also a search for greater autonomy and diversification of geopolitical alliances. The region is undergoing significant changes in its political and geopolitical dynamics, which could have long-term implications for international relations in West Africa.

When analyzing the energy balance data, it is possible that a notable concern arises regarding the exploration of uranium by these African countries, supplying it mainly to France. Niger is one of the main suppliers of uranium to France. This analysis could indicate a significant disparity in how this exploration is conducted and how benefits are distributed. This suggests the possibility of underlying inequalities in the relationship between France and these



Figure 1. Picture showing people support for president Putin in Russia.
Source: Le Monde, Credit: AP.



Figure 2. This picture denotes a demonstration in favor of the withdrawal of French military forces from the country.
Source: RFI, Credit: AFP.

developing nations.

This concern about the exploitation of natural resources, such as uranium, raises important questions about equity and justice in the distribution of economic benefits generated by these resources. In such situations, it is often essential to consider how revenues generated from exploration are shared, whether they contribute to local development and whether communities living close to extraction sites are being adequately compensated and protected in terms of health and the environment.

Therefore, these data may indicate not only differences in electricity capacity, but also inequalities in economic and trade relations between France and these natural resource supplying countries.

The recent events in Mali, as well as in the other mentioned states, appear to indicate a shared objective: a desire for a reduced French presence in their territories and a reevaluation of cooperation agreements with France. These actions might also suggest a willingness to explore new business partners, with Russia seemingly

Table 1. Energy balance of Niger.

Electricity	Total/year (bilh. KWh)	Niger by habitant (kWh)	USA by habitant (kWh)
Consumption	1.33	50.57	11.695.27
Production	581.42	22.18	12.147.64
Importation	1.06	40.33	12.147.64

18.6% of the country's population (as of 2021) has access to electricity. In rural areas, the participation was 9.1%.
Source: Dadosmundiais.com.

Table 2. Energy balance of France.

Electricity	Total/year (bilh. KWh)	France by habitant (kWh)	Europe by habitante (kWh)
Consumption	472.70	6.958.04	5.462.78
Productions	553.71	8.150.56	5.869.23
Importation	19.61	288.70	773.65
Exportation	64.43	948.32	770.49

100.0% of the country's population (as of 2021) has access to Electricity.
Source: Dadosmundiais.com.

emerging as a potential alternative (Allan and Ojeda-García, 2022).

The military coups that have occurred in these countries may partly arise from the perception that the democratic processes as practiced may not have fully reflected the will and autonomy of local populations. It appears there is a belief that historical ties with France may have influenced the selection of presidents in the region. Consequently, the new military leaders often appear to adopt a nationalist stance and express a readiness to safeguard their nations' interests, potentially challenging foreign influence, particularly that of France. This could include considerations of the withdrawal of French military troops from their territories and a reimagining of international relations with a focus on diversifying alliances.

According to the specialist in international politics, Simon Pascal Alain Handy (France 24, 2023), in an interview with France 24, he suggests that recent coups d'état might reflect a pivotal moment in African history. It seems there is a desire among a generation to break free from what could be perceived as a historical legacy of colonial influence, although they may not have received concrete political responses to their aspirations. This situation highlights a complex scenario, where external influences seem to persist in attempting to maintain control over the African continent. Handy's insights call for contemplation on the urgency of addressing these challenges and enabling Africa to potentially forge its own path towards development and self-determination.

One notable figure who shares similar sentiments is Fanon et al. (1963) and Mbembe (2001), a renowned African philosopher, political scientist, and historian. Mbembe's works often explore postcolonial African politics

and the complex dynamics of power on the continent. He argues that Africa must confront its historical legacies and challenge neocolonial forces that continue to influence its political and economic landscape. Like Handy (2023) and Mbembe (2001) highlight the need for Africans to shape their destiny and assert their sovereignty.

Additionally, African leaders and intellectuals, such as Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, former Nigerian Finance Minister and Director-General of the World Trade Organization (WTO)⁴, advocate for a more equitable global order that empowers African nations economically and politically.

They stress the importance of Africa's voice in international affairs and its ability to make decisions that align with its interests.

In essence, there is a growing chorus of voices within Africa and among international scholars who share the belief that Africa should assert its independence, challenge historical legacies, and pursue its own path toward development and self-determination. These perspectives collectively call for addressing the complex challenges facing the continent and nurturing its potential for autonomy and growth.

The argument that African leaders collaborate with the West, contributing to the maintenance of Western influence, is in line with the perspective presented by Chinweizu (1975) in his work *"The West and the Rest of Us: White Predators, Black Slavers, and the African Elite"*, published in 1975. The author highlights the responsibility of the African elite in maintaining

⁴ Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala 7^o Diretor-Geral da Organização Mundial do Comércio

neocolonialism, arguing that some of them collaborated with Western powers to the detriment of their own compatriots. Chinweizu criticizes these elite for its complicity in the continued exploitation of Africa, highlighting how these collaborations have often served Western interests to the detriment of African sustainable development and sovereignty.

A concrete example of this collaboration can be seen in unequal trade agreements, in which African leaders have consented to unfavorable terms for their nations, harming their economies and populations in favor of personal benefits or political advantages.

Another example is the exploitation of natural resources, where local leaders often allow foreign companies to extract valuable resources without adequate environmental safeguards or a fair distribution of profits, benefiting only Western companies at the expense of the well-being of local communities.

These collaborative practices have contributed to the persistence of Western influence in many African nations, with local leaders often prioritizing their personal interests or maintaining the status quo over the interests of their citizens and the sustainable development of Africa as a Whole.

Furthermore, it is important to note that in recent years there has been an increase in public debate about the role of France and other Western powers in the exploration of Africa. This discussion raises questions about neocolonialism, in which African nations, despite their formal independence, remain subjugated to Western powers in various forms, including economic exploitation, political influence, and cultural imposition.

However, it is essential to address these issues with care and precision, avoiding making generalized or simplistic statements. The debate on neocolonialism in Africa is complex and requires an in-depth analysis of the political, economic and cultural dynamics at play. Therefore, it is worth resorting to works such as that of Chinweizu Ibekwe to support a more informed understanding of these issues and promote constructive discussions on the topic.

CONSEQUENCES OF COUPS D'ÉTAT

Political crises and sanctions in West Africa: Coups d'Etat and international implications

ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), also known as ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), is a regional integration organization made up of fifteen countries in West Africa. Its main objectives include promoting economic integration, facilitating regional trade and strengthening political cooperation in the region. The importance of ECOWAS in maintaining political stability in West Africa is discussed in Nana Konadu Agyeman, "Maintaining

political stability in West Africa: Has ECOWAS Parliament lived up to its mandate?". The article explores the crucial role played by ECOWAS in promoting political stability in the West African region.

The organization has played a fundamental role in preventing conflicts, resolving political crises and promoting democracy in the region. Furthermore, ECOWAS has strived to facilitate dialogue between member countries, thereby strengthening regional cooperation.

Through its initiative to maintain political stability, ECOWAS has played a prominent role in resolving conflicts and promoting measures aimed at maintaining peace and harmony in West Africa. ECOWAS efforts include mediating political conflicts, supervising elections and strengthening democratic institutions in member countries. On July 30, 2023, an Extraordinary Session of the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) took place in the city of Abuja, Nigeria. This special session was chaired by His Excellency Bola Ahmed Tinubu, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and also President of the ECOWAS Assembly. The overriding reason for convening this extraordinary meeting was the need to address and respond to the recent political events that took place in the Republic of Niger, dated from 26 July 2023.

This important summit had the distinguished presence of several Heads of State, together with duly authorized representatives of ECOWAS member nations, in addition to the participation of representatives of regional and international organizations. During the proceedings of the meeting, the events that took place in the Republic of Niger were deeply discussed, notably an attempted coup and the illegal arrest of President Muhammed Bazoum, as well as members of his government.

In this context, ECOWAS, in unison with several other international organizations and nations, issued a strong condemnation of the coup attempt and the arrest of President Bazoum. The leaders present at the summit reiterated the indisputable legitimacy of President Bazoum and made a categorical appeal for his immediate release and, likewise, for the full restoration of constitutional order in the Republic of Niger.

Additionally, ECOWAS has taken the decision to apply a series of sanction measures against Niger, which include closing borders, suspending commercial and financial transactions, freezing assets and imposing travel restrictions on those involved in the coup attempt.

The said summit was also opportune to express its sincere appreciation to President Bola Ahmed Tinubu for his outstanding performance in leading ECOWAS since assuming the presidency of the Conference. It was also noted that these countries Mali, Niger and Burkina-Faso have been suspended from the ECOWAS bloc with immediate effect.

The states of Mali, Niger are currently under

suspension by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This measure was adopted due to the application of the same sanctions that were previously imposed on Niger, as mentioned previously. Furthermore, these nations were also the target of financial sanctions by the European Union.

The United Nations (UN) responded to this situation by issuing calls for the restoration of peace and security in the region. The UN is committed to vigorous efforts to ensure that order is promptly restored. France also took the decision to apply sanctions of a financial nature in relation to these countries.

Recently, it was possible to follow the speech given by the current President of France, Emmanuel Macron, in response to these coups d'état. In it, President Macron emphasized the importance of restoring legitimate leaders, that is, those who were democratically elected to assume power. However, it is regrettable that these calls were met with resistance, as the coup plotters demanded the immediate withdrawal of French troops from the affected countries. President Macron, in turn, maintained a firm position in refusing the withdrawal of French military forces. He argued that such a decision should be the responsibility of the legitimate president of Mali and Niger, highlighting that he does not recognize the current transitional government. This impasse highlights the complexity of the situation and the difficult negotiations that are taking place behind the scenes in international relations.

In response to the coup d'état, these countries presented an ultimatum, in which they requested the withdrawal of French military troops, which constitutes a violation of the defense cooperation agreements established with France.

However, President Macron of France has expressed his reluctance to agree to the withdrawal of French troops from these territories. Cortright and Lopez (2002), provides a comprehensive explanation of how countries impose sanctions on other nations for specific objectives. This book sheds light on the stances of neighboring countries when they opt to enforce sanctions against countries experiencing coups d'état, particularly within the context of ECOWAS meetings.

It's essential to note that the fundamental objectives of various sanctions, whether imposed by the United Nations, the European Union, or ECOWAS, remain consistent. These sanctions are designed to serve a common purpose. They aim to influence or pressure a particular country to alter its policies, behaviors, or to adhere to specific international standards. Crucially, these sanctions are applied without causing excessive harm to civilians or adversely affecting the general population.

Furthermore, these countries terminated their diplomatic agreements, demanding the withdrawal of the French ambassador from their territories. France has reiterated on several occasions that military agreements have been

concluded with the legally constituted authorities of Niger and that the responsibility for the termination of these agreements lies with the Nigerien authorities themselves.

It is crucial to note that these countries are landlocked nations, which can pose considerable challenges in the areas of import and export, as most of their neighboring countries have closed their borders. In this context, Russia's support plays a fundamental role in the survival of these states.

Economic and social consequences of coups d'état

The closure of neighboring countries' borders as a result of coups d'état can have devastating effects on regional trade and the economy. A concrete example is the impact on local traders. Consider a merchant who supplies products such as cloth and other goods. When borders are closed, this trader can no longer carry out his business transactions easily. This can result in significant economic problems, including decreased revenues, increased alternative transportation costs, and the possible loss of jobs. Additionally, many of the countries affected by coups d'état are landlocked countries, complicating the situation even more. The lack of direct access to seaports makes both the export and import of goods difficult. This can lead to delays in deliveries, increases in transportation costs and a decrease in the competitiveness of companies from these countries in the international market. To deepen this analysis, we can consider the work "*Globalization and Its Discontents*" by Lecture (2002). Although the book focuses primarily on the consequences of globalization, it also addresses the complex interactions between politics, economics, and international trade, offering valuable insights into how political events such as coups d'état can affect the global and regional economy.

In addition to the economic impacts, coups d'état also have significant repercussions on the social fabric of the affected countries. The political instability and uncertainty that accompany these events can generate a series of social challenges. One of the main social impacts is related to the security and stability of local communities. Coup's d'état often triggers internal conflicts, ethnic divisions and political tensions, resulting in increased violence and instability. This not only puts the lives and well-being of citizens at risk, but also undermines social cohesion. Furthermore, political turmoil often leads to the displacement of people. Citizens in affected areas may be forced to flee their homes due to conflict or political persecution. This creates a humanitarian crisis, with displaced people facing challenges such as lack of shelter, limited access to health and education services, and difficulties meeting basic needs. Another important social impact is related to access to education. Political instability often disrupts the regular functioning of schools and universities. This means that young people face

disruptions to their education, which can have long-term effects on their personal development and employment prospects. To support this analysis of social impacts, you might consider Skocpol (1979), and Fang (2020). The book explores how political events, such as revolutions and conflicts, affect a country's social and political structures. Skocpol offers insights into how political changes can trigger profound social transformations, and by citing this work you will further strengthen your analysis of the social impacts of coups d'état.

Discussing issues related to education, let's consider an international case as an example. The cancellation of student registrations could have severe consequences for individuals who were pursuing education opportunities in France. They are now confronted with uncertainty regarding their academic standing and future prospects. Furthermore, the suspension of all official relations signifies a rupture in diplomatic communications and collaboration between France and these affected countries. We can verify this situation through the email Koffi received on August 30, just two days before his departure to France (the students mentioned testify using assumed first names). Koffi, a doctoral student in geography from Burkina Faso, received the following message from a representative at the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs: *"I regret to inform you that we are revoking our support for your stay in France, including the cancellation of all Campus France services (plane ticket, allowances, and health insurance) (Le Monde, 2023).*

CONCLUSION

The research in question led to an in-depth examination of the Francophone nations of West Africa, their independence processes and the challenges they currently face. Firstly, the complexity of the paths to independence for these nations was highlighted, which involved cooperation agreements with France, granting autonomy under certain conditions. These agreements included commitments in the military, economic, educational and cultural areas, all of which continue to affect these countries' relations with France.

One notable aspect that emerged from this research was France's "soft power" strategy, which promoted French language and culture throughout the region. This led many countries to adopt French as their official language, consolidating French cultural influence in the region. However, at the same time, these countries faced internal challenges, including corruption, political instability, and discontent with the government.

A series of recent coups d'état, particularly in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, have raised concerns about the underlying causes. Systemic corruption was identified as a significant concern, where citizens often felt compelled to bribe public officials to access basic services and rights. This form of corruption undermines trust in government institutions and creates a society where

justice and public services are distorted by financial incentives.

Furthermore, the persistent presence of terrorist and insurgent groups in various parts of the region has also contributed to instability. These security challenges have created an environment of insecurity and fear among the population, fueling discontent and the Search for alternative solutes.

Recent events, including coups d'état, have reflected a search for greater autonomy and a diversification of geopolitical alliances. Russia's growing support for these countries suggests a trend toward a shift in traditional alliances, calling into question French influence in the region.

However, it is important to note that these developments also had consequences. Sanctions from ECOWAS, the European Union and France were imposed in response to these coups d'état, affecting these nations economically. Furthermore, the revocation of African students' enrollment in French institutions and the suspension of official relations show a hardening of the French stance towards events in the region.

Ultimately, this research reminds us that the Francophone nations of West Africa face a complex intersection of political, economic, and cultural issues. The quest for true independence and sovereignty continues as these countries seek to balance their international relations and address domestic challenges. The evolution of these geopolitical dynamics has significant implications for the region and international relations in general. It is an ever-changing field that deserves close monitoring and ongoing critical analysis.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

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Full Length Research Paper

Low wages - corruption nexus: The Sokoto state of Nigeria civil service dilemmas

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This paper examines the nexus between low wages and corruption in the Nigerian civil service. Methodologically, the paper adopted the survey research design. The unit of analysis of this study is the civil servant. The population of this study was drawn from the civil servants in Sokoto State totaling twenty-nine thousand five hundred and eighty-three (29,583). The paper anchored on “clash of morality theory” which argued that corruption exist in the civil service as a result of cultural values where people considered as not corrupt acts even when such behaviour violates some formal standards or rules set down by the state for public officials. The paper argued that corruption in the civil service is a product of low wages which result to poverty, poor health care, and worsening educational attainment. The study found that there is a statistically significant relationship between income per month and the rate of corruption, and that the higher the income, the lower the level of corruption in the state ministries. The paper concludes that low wages have a significant negative impact on the level of corruption in the Sokoto state civil service because it was found that civil servants at the bottom of the salary scale are the most corrupt, and that the rate of corruption decreases as they move up the salary scale, implying that the lower the wages, the higher the level of corruption, and vice versa.

Keywords: Bureaucratic corruption, Public funds, Efficiency, Productivity, Patronage.

INTRODUCTION

Corruption wrecks havoc on political, economic, and social progress in every political system. It stymies development efforts, retards bureaucratic progress, and undermines political institutions by undermining the credibility of government. It is claimed that corruption is widespread in the civil service, affecting the supply of public goods and services and socio-economic development of the affected state. Corruption in the civil service leads to the abuse of public power for private

benefit, which directly and indirectly worsens the problem of poverty (low income, poor health and education, shock vulnerability, and other characteristics) in countries with the problem of economic growth and democratic transition (Chetwynd et al., 2003). When it comes to the civil service, corruption is defined as the unlawful use of one's delegated authority. A civil servant is paid to do tasks for which he or she has delegated authority (Adam, 2015). There may be misconduct or some type of

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maladministration if the civil servant does not do the tasks, or does not perform them well (Caiden, 1991) or does it in a manner that enhances his personal benefits. There have been arguments in the extant literature on the effects of low wages on corruption. Poor pay and salaries in the civil service, research has shown, play a big role in the trivialization of petty corruption. It is sometimes hypothetically stated that the higher the wages the less corrupt a civil servant becomes. Thus, insufficient pay for civil servants is said to encourage rent-seeking behavior because good wages or high salary level allows the civil servant and its family to maintain a reasonable quality of life (Tanzi, 1998). The proposition may also be right that the lower the rate of unlawful catch-ups, the lower the level of civil service wages. Corruption opportunities therefore become the primary motivator for entering the public sector (van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). It is germane to note that, though wages and corruption in the public sector have continuously been linked in empirical literature, mixed results have also been found in empirical studies on whether high public-sector wages are an effective policy against corruption. In other words, different conclusions have been reached. These are frequently divided into two categories: negative and positive. Countries such as Nigeria, Argentina, Georgia, Ghana, Peru, Singapore, and others have enacted public sector reforms to raise the wages of government officials in an effort to combat corruption (Kunt et al., 2021). The evidence for such interventions' efficacy is mixed. For instance, some studies find no effect (Panizza, 2001; Ades and DiTella, 1997; Treisman, 2007) or reverse causation (Rose-Ackerman and Sreide, 2012), with high levels of corruption leading to low wages in the public sector. Previous research on the impact of increased pay on corruption, on the other hand, might be explained by wage inequalities in the public sector as well as cultural factors in a specific society, which Nigeria is no exception. This study therefore is an attempt to contribute to this debate and whether there is an inverse relationship between wages and corruption. Does low pay genuinely foster corruption in the civil service? That is the issue this paper seeks to answer. Our case study is the Sokoto State Civil Service.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

Corruption

Corruption is ubiquitous and it is neither country bound nor culture specific. Each country's backdrop is shaped by its unique moral, legal, political, and administrative structure. In view of rising challenges in that country, each country has its own set of circumstances, a different perspective, and a different goal for constructing a definition. Because of all of these elements, finding a uniform definition of corruption has been challenging. Rather than developing a specific definition of corruption

that can be applied across all social, moral, legal, cultural, and economic perspectives, a more functional approach is used, namely, to specify and identify behaviors that can be clearly defined as corrupt acts or offences, and thus prevented and sanctioned. Corruption is the misuse of public office for personal benefit. Bribery, nepotism, and the theft of public funds for personal benefit are examples of this type of behavior. It is the act of offering or obtaining an advantage through measures that are inconsistent with one's duty or others' rights. Nye (1967) defined corruption as behavior that deviates from the formal obligations inherent in public service in order to obtain a private benefit (staff, close family, private clique), in terms of money or status; or who violates rules prohibiting the exercise of certain types of private influences. This definition is in consonance with the Weberian postulations and idea of bureaucracy. Within this perspective, any behaviour that contradicts bureaucratic principles and models as espoused by Weber is corruption. Beyond this, corruption can be seen at a general level as the improper or even appropriate use of influence for personal gains or aggrandizement. In defining corruption therefore, motive or the motivating factor is very critical because legal procedures can be used and manipulated for a selfish end and or purpose. In our context, the end purpose of the behaviour of the bureaucrats is significant. If the behaviour derails from the public interest or benefits, it is considered as corruption. However, as the concept of corruption is generic so also its forms are numerous. Scholars have identified various distinct categories of corruption widespread among civil servants for analytical purposes and clarity this paper identified few as the have direct correlation with bureaucratic corruption. These are: Petty corruption (flies), grand corruption (tigers), and state capture are examples of these.

Petty corruption

This is characterized by lower-level authorities who may have possibilities to do wrong actions, such as forging records to evade a tax and getting a kickback as a result (Adam, 2015). It might involve doing something legal, but somewhat in an illegal way, such as providing a permission for an activity that satisfies the criteria, but allowing it to bypass the queue in exchange for a personal profit or favor. Civil servants who engage in such behavior and receive rewards in addition to their wage are using the influence and the privileges the office they occupy provides for personal benefits. This may be considered as betraying their office's trust. In this regard corruption to Hallak and Poisson (2007), involves public officials at all levels (from government to local and school levels) and many tiny sums of money; while it normally has a minimal influence, it can have a significant societal impact, particularly for the poor and most vulnerable. "Small transactions between lower-level government

officials and the general population" are included. The provision of commodities and government services to the public is frequently hampered by this level of corruption (GOPAC, 2005).

Grand corruption

It is otherwise known as political corruption and an elite crime which may be a conspiracy between political elite and the bureaucratic elite. This is frequently described in the literature as a situation in which politicians manipulate state instruments for personal gain, causing policy to be terribly distorted, to the point where they effectively "own" the state, its institutions, and resources (Johnston, 2005; Pope, 1995). Grand corruption refers to the bribery of heads of state, ministers, and other high-ranking officials, and usually includes enormous sums of money. Grand corruption is defined by Andvig et al. (2001) as misappropriation or embezzlement of government funds, or the tailoring of public laws, rules, and regulations for the advantage of particular favored parties in exchange for bribes, or merely to maintain political support and power. Grand corruption, according to Hallak and Poison (2007), involves high-ranking officials and politicians, as well as big sums of money, and has a significant economic, political, and social impact.

State capture

Rather than politicians extorting citizens or kleptocrats dominating business and stealing the country's assets, "state capture" scenarios occur when law, which has been legitimately drafted and approved by the government or parliament, distributes benefits in a corrupt manner (Adam, 2015). Outside interests not only sway state laws, but also utilize their clout to get laws drafted in their favor. Officials and politicians can be influenced or bribed to produce legislation that grants a firm access to natural resource exploitation, a monopoly on a railway line, media and publishing licenses, or tax exemption.

Civil service

Civil service of Nigeria is conceived from a broad perspective and it includes the following institutions, the federal civil service, the state civil services, local governments, statutory corporations of both the federal and state government, business enterprises with full or majority ownership by either the federal or state government, authorities or commissions established by the federal or state government, educational institutions established or financed mainly by federal and or state government, the Nigeria Police Force, the armed forces, the judiciary, the prison service, customs, civil defense

among others (Federal Republic of Nigeria-FRN, 1999). The public service is a creation of the collective sovereign will of the people or the constitution, and as such, it is an institution created to serve the collective will of the people. It is the body of men and women employed by the state to execute and implement the policies and programmes of the government of the day. It is the permanent infrastructure of government in a modern state (Obaro, 2004).

Theoretical underpinning

Civil servants have a critical role in promoting a Nigerian administrative system that is both effective and efficient. Performance of civil servants in Nigeria has been heavily castigated because of disparity between their expected role and their actual productivity on the one hand and their non-commendable contributions to national development on the other hand. A number of factors account for the low productivity in the Nigerian public service including, fallen morale, poor appreciation of the importance of time, poor commitment and dedication to duty and corruption among others. Among these factors, corruption stands out as the major reason for low performance and poor productivity in the Nigerian civil service. Theoretically, a number of theories are competing for explaining the nature, forms and dimensions of corruption in the civil service (de Graaf 2007). Some of these include Principal Agency theory, theory of the Two Publics, Prebendalism, Patrimonialism and Clash of Morality Theory among others. The Principal Agency Theory emphasizes the presence of a supervisory principal and/or an agent who supervises the agent's duties, which could be a government auditor or a senior civil servant. Corruption may occur in this structure if the agent has more access to critical administrative documentation than the principal and tries to obtain pay-offs by illegitimately providing critical information to those outside the setup or administration without the supervisor's knowledge. On the other hand, the prebendalism theory's main argument was based on a description of the patron-client relationship in politics for self-appropriation. They contended that civil servants use state offices as a "prebend" that can be appropriated by officeholders in generate material benefits for themselves and their associates. While the clash of morality theory argued that corruption in any society is associated with behaviour that violates some formal standards or rules set down by the state for public officials. The theory further emphasis that societies like Nigeria, granting favour to relatives and personal friends is not perceived as corruption which according to Weberian ideals it is seen as corruption. In this study, "clash of morality theory" is adopted in order to place the subject matter in a proper context. According to the "clash of moral values theory", a society's values and norms have a direct impact on an individual's behavior, leading to corruption.

For example, kinship ties as well as loyalty and favoritisms to one ethnic group or religious affiliations. This is a culture where gift-giving or cares for extended family and friends is valued highly. In this circumstance, sharing or dispersing the rewards of power may not appear to be immoral at all but which however contradicts the established civil service rules, *a la* Max Weber. This is what Ogundiya and Amzat (2020) aptly described as a clash of morality and legality. However, the clash of morality theory have been criticized for been ethnocentricism in nature, which assumes that developing countries have these tendencies of cultural values because they are still immature and so inevitably corrupt. In addition, the theories appear to focus on the symptoms of corruption caused by these moral norms rather than the underlying causes, meaning that they lack universal analytical weight. As a means of countering corruption, these principles advocate for the enforcement of ethical standards as well as the elimination of favoritism and cronyism.

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

There is a substantial number of researches on the implications of public sector employee remuneration on corruption. Dominik and Christina (2017) maintained that salaries of public officials may also be a factor to consider while analyzing the reasons of corruption. For example, one variation of the efficiency-wage theory claims that higher public-sector wages deter corruption because of the high personal costs of arrest and expulsion from government employment or administration (Klitgaard, 1997; Mookherjee, 1995; van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). Higher public-sector wages have also been recommended as a way to combat corruption by attracting more honest people to work for the government (Bond, 2008). According to Becker and Stigler (1974) model, greater incomes are associated with less corruption due to the consequences of wrongdoing. If a bureaucrat accepts bribes and is caught, he will lose his job and be forced to work in the private sector. According to Akerlof and Yellen (1994) "fair wage" hypothesis, public officials would participate in corruption until their pay rises to what they consider to be a fair salary. Fair pay for public officials may cause society to criticize corruption rather than accept it as a cultural norm (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). The bigger the expected loss from losing a job in the public sector compared to the private sector, the fewer the incentives to engage in corrupt activity-given that there is an adequate level of monitoring (Dominik and Christina, 2017). Others focus on the moral consequences of corruption. Higher compensation may appear more equitable to bureaucrats, making it morally more difficult for them to bribe their employer, the government (Van Veldhuizen, 2011). Some scholars argued to the contrary. For instance, Mookherjee and Png (1995) maintain that a greater public-sector

wage does not guarantee honesty when bargaining over the worth of a bribe. This is confirmed in a study by Foltz and Opoku-Ageyemang (2015) when they examined the impact of tripling police officer wages on bribe extortion from truck drivers in Ghana. They discovered that raising police salaries boosted the amount and frequency of bribes given to cops by truck drivers. The authors speculate that the wage reform boosted the officers' social status and affected their definition of "fair" income, resulting in upward revisions of predicted bribe amounts. Mishra et al. (2008) investigates the consequences of a 1997 pay reform in India, which raised the salary of customs officials. They discovered that the change had little effect on tariff evasion: officials continued to accept bribes at the same rate after obtaining raises in salary. According to Light (2014) a large boost in police officer salary as part of the reform of the police system resulted in a major drop in corruption in Georgia. In Argentina, Di Tella and Schargrotsky (2003) investigated the link between wage premiums and corruption. They found that conducting audits on a regular basis reduces corruption. When the risk of discovery is either low or extremely high, however, increased compensation for procurement officials do not diminish corruption; instead, larger wage premiums combined with intermediate auditing levels reduce corruption.

The data on the influence of salary reductions on corruption, on the other hand, is more conclusive. Wage cuts in the public sector are likely to increase corruption. Borcan et al. (2015) study the impact of an unanticipated 25% salary cut in Romanian public schools on standardized exam passing rates. They discovered that the percentage of pupils who passed the tests in public schools increased when compared to private institutions. According to Gorodnichenko and Peter (2007), public sector employees in Ukraine who are underpaid in comparison to their private sector counterparts may compensate by accepting bribes. They point out that the wage disparity between the public and private sectors is growing at the top of the wage distribution, suggesting that decompressing public sector wages might curb corruption.

The hypothesis is intriguing, but there is no empirical data to back it up. van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) look at 31 nations and find that there is a negative relationship. They found that corruption index reduces by 0.5 points when the civil service wage increases by one point relative to the manufacturing sector wage. However, their sample is tiny, and it primarily includes developing countries, which could lead to a reversal of causality problem. Poorer countries may pay low wages to their workers due to the widespread belief that administrators make enough money from corruption. In addition, their fiscal policy is less efficient in general than that of industrialized countries, creating another endogeneity problem (Lambsdorff, 2006). Other studies like Treisman's (2007) likewise suffer from same difficulties and/or insignificant results. Indeed, it is evident that the empirical

evidence on the effect of public sector wages on corruption remains inconclusive. This is partly due to the scarcity of micro-level empirical literature on corruption and pay, as well as the challenges of gathering high-quality data (Gans-Morse et al., 2017; Olken and Pande, 2012). Individuals who exploit public service for personal benefit have no motive to divulge information that could jeopardize their position (Ackerman, 2016). When accounting for the factor that facilitate corruption, scholars argued that motivation for corruption is quite strong due to poverty, low and declining civil service salaries, no concept of insurance or other risk-spreading mechanisms as is prevalent in richer countries to cover risks like illness, accidents, and unemployment, similarly on the other hand, opportunities to engage in corruption are numerous due to weak accountability mechanisms (Gray and Kaufmann, 1998). According to studies, civil servants are underpaid but have a lot of administrative flexibility and a low risk of being discovered and punished, which gives them a lot of possibilities to misuse their power and engage in corruption. Furthermore, the Nigerian culture of gift-giving and family ties may be a factor in corrupt behaviour.

Nature of bureaucratic corruption in Nigeria civil service

Bureaucratic corruption is defined as "any sort of enticement or compensation offered and taken" in order to complete official work or assignments that should be done on a regular basis, or to circumvent official processes or bend rules and regulations for personal gain. As a result, bureaucratic corruption comprises a complex web of favors that are only given in exchange for further favors that are either predicted or expected. In essence, bureaucratic corruption is concerned with the ways and means by which all types of corruption have become entrenched in Nigerian institutions (Aluko and Adesopo, 2003). Bureaucratic corruption is tied to bureaucrats' activities. Historically, the term was used to describe the process of buying favor from government administrators who design and implement economic and political policies. The concept, on the other hand, goes beyond favor buying to include the violation of public duty by bureaucrats or public officials. According, Lawal and Tobi (2006) bureaucratic corruption could be explained by the type and character of the bureaucratic entity. They stressed that when bureaucracy outgrows its organizational structure, it becomes dehumanized and monolithic; as a result, corruption is more likely to evolve, persist, and spread due to an undefined structure, a lack of social values, the integration of selfish interests above and beyond those of the organization, and the absence of rules and procedures (Lawal and Tobi, 2006). Each succeeding administration or government in Nigeria has always accused the previous administration or regime of corruption, particularly during the numerous military

regimes. Systemic corruption has been shown to skew incentives, erode institutions, and redistribute wealth and power to those who do not deserve it (Kayode, 2000). The pervasiveness of bureaucratic corruption has been explained in several ways. For instance, the Nigerian bureaucracies were accused of nepotism, ethnic loyalty, sectionalism, and, most crucially, corruption, according to the Udoji report of 1974. The investigation also found that the bureaucracy as a whole is not only crooked, but also results-oriented. As a result, when the Murtala/Obasanjo administration assumed control in 1975, one of the first things it did was purge the government. Over ten thousand top-level bureaucrats were fired for reasons ranging from inefficiency, decreased productivity, intoxication, behaviour not in the public interest, and, most crucially, corruption (Anise, 1986). Furthermore, it should be noted that when Nigeria got independence in 1960, the bureaucracy was spared the pain of corruption. In fact, when the first military coup occurred in 1966, the troops were particularly irritated by the extent of corruption perpetrated by the political elite, which may legitimately be called political corruption. It is claimed that the height of bureaucratic corruption occurred when public servants who were not raised in the traditions of political professionalism witnessed how politicians who had previously been nothing became wealthy overnight through patronages, gifts, bribes, and outright embezzlement of public funds. As a result, it was only a matter of time until bureaucrats joined politicians, and political corruption gave birth to bureaucratic corruption (Akpan, 2011)

Nigerians keep focusing on the politicians and other political office holders as the conduit pipe that drains government resources through corruption whereas the civil servants are enmeshed in bureaucratic corruption with a higher intensity (Akpan and Onya (2018). The abuse of the procurement and public contracting processes is pervasive in the country's government. Government contracts are frequently poorly handled or abandoned because public employees who are supposed to manage the deal become collaborators of the defaulting contractor after being rewarded. Those that award contracts after obtaining remuneration are unable to ensure that projects are carried out properly (Obaro, 2004).

Measurement of corruption in the civil service

On the construct and measurement of corruption in Civil Service, several theoretical and empirical investigations have been reported (Navot, 2014; Rose-Ackerman, 2016; Treisman, 2007). The main challenge is frequently related to the phenomenon's "knowability," with each data generation strategy having its own set of strengths and drawbacks. Corruption is a covert transaction by nature, making it difficult to detect and quantify. Several organizations, including the World Bank, Transparency

International (TI), and Pricewaterhouse Coopers Foundation, have attempted to develop corruption indicators; however, all of them rely on aggregate surveys of citizens, businesses, or experts, and thus their findings are based on subjective perceptions rather than objective data. It is emphasized that quantifying corruption is riddled with methodological difficulties (for more on measurement issues see Kaufmann et al., 2006; Sampford et al., 2006). Despite the widespread nature of the problem, calculating the amount of money wasted each year due to corruption is extremely difficult. While the major international financial institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) are cautious of attempts to establish a baseline figure for "grand corruption" (funds stolen by government officials), a fascinating World Bank working paper published in February 2020 provided a glimpse behind the curtain, revealing that World Bank aid disbursements to the most aid-dependent countries coincided with significant increases in deposits held in offshore financial centers. The amount of missing foreign aid, "suggests a leakage rate of roughly 7.5% for the average highly aid-dependent country". Transparency International is a leader in assessing perceived levels of corruption across countries with its annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The CPI is based on thousands of surveys conducted each year on the perceived degree of corruption in governments, with an annual ranking and scoring system from zero ("highly corrupt") to 100 ("very clean"). Likewise, the World Bank's Control of Corruption Index (CCI) scores (number six within its set of Worldwide Governance Indicators) rank countries according to their perceived levels of corruption. Similar to the CPI, the CCI is based on thousands of surveys conducted each year on the perceived degree of corruption in governments, with an annual ranking and score system from 0 to 1, with higher values corresponding to better outcomes. Despite the subjective limitations of the survey method for ranking government performance, these indices are still considered the best available approximations of shifts in degrees of international corruption in the world from year to year.

METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

This is basically a quantitative study which aimed at examining the relationship between low wages and corruption. The study adopted the survey research design. Survey research design was considered most appropriate because the sample size for the study was large. The unit of analysis of this study is the civil servant. The population of this study consists of all the civil servants in Sokoto State totaling twenty-nine thousand five hundred and eighty-three (29,583) (Vanguard Newspaper, June 12 2020). The sample size for the study was three hundred and eighty (380). The sample size was determined using the online Raosoft sample size calculator which was set at a margin error of 5 and 95% confidence level. This cross-sectional study sampled three hundred and eighty (380) respondents from the three groups of employees: junior staff cadre, senior staff cadre and public or political office holders in Sokoto

State ministries (Figure 1). A semi structured questionnaire was administered on the three hundred and eighty (380) respondents who were purposively selected from each of the staff cadre as shown on the Table 1.

The questionnaire which was the instrument for the data collection contained two sections the first section, which was the demographic section contained six items while the second section contained twelve items that were used to measure the rate corruption in the civil service. In all, there were eighteen (18) questions in the questionnaire. The questionnaire was self-administered on the respondents. It was administered with the aid of four research assistants. The data collected was analyzed using simple percentage, chi square and linear regression. These methods of data analysis were contained in Statistical Package for Social Science (version 22) which was used in this study.

RESULTS

Out of all the three hundred and eighty questionnaires (380) that were administered, thirty-nine (39) were missing while forty-five (45) were not filled appropriately. Therefore, only Two hundred and ninety-six (296) questionnaires were used for this analysis. Figure 2 revealed that majority (90.6%) of the respondents perceive the use of office facilities (such as paper, vehicles, etc.) to meet their urgent personal needs as corruption. Recruitment based on family ties, friendship networks, and party loyalty was perceived as corrupt by 86.5%, and waiving certain standard rules and procedures was perceived as corrupt by 82.2%. 75.0% indicated that lobbying to influence transfer and promotion is corruption. 67.7% indicated that taking tasks with financial gains more seriously than other tasks is corruption. 57.3% indicated that influencing their transfer due to marital status is corruption and 29.2% indicated that asking people for favor in order to speeding up their applications and requests is corruption. 21.9% indicated that they make friends with the police, road safety, PHCN, etc. to avoid being penalized for corruption. 20.8% come late to work due to family demand. 14.6% of respondents indicated that demanding money to facilitate an application is corrupt; 12.5% indicated that paying money to be recruited into the civil service is corrupt; and 10.4% indicated that asking colleagues to sign in for you if you are late or do not come to the office at all is corrupt. From these results, civil servants in Sokoto state feel the use of office facilities (such as paper, vehicles, etc.) to meet their urgent personal needs is corruption. The most commonly practiced corruption in the Sokoto State Civil Service was recruitment based on family ties, friendship networks, and party loyalty, waiver of certain standard rules and procedures, lobbying to influence transfer and promotion, taking tasks with financial gains more seriously than other tasks, and influencing their transfer due to marital status. This is because when placed on the 50% scale they were more than 50% meaning that they were high while other variable was less than 50% which means that their occurrence in the civil service was low.

In all the result more than 50% indicates that the rate of




Figure 1. Percentage of civil servants of three cadre in Sokoto.
Source: Field Survey, 2022.

Table 1. Proportionate sample table.

Staff cadre	Population	Proportionate sample
Junior staff cadre	12,303	158
Senior staff cadre	17,085	219
Political office holders	195	3
Total	29,583	380

Source: Field Survey, 2022.

corruption was high with 76.7%.

Table 2 shows the statistical relationship between the demographic variables of the respondents and the rate of corruption in the ministry. The table shows that corruption was low among 21.6% of the male civil servants, high among 48.3% of the male civil servants; corruption was low among 1.7% of the female civil servants and high among 28.4% of the female civil servants. There is statistically significant relationship between sex and rate of corruption using the chi-square test tool because the calculated value (X-Cal), which was 22.85, was more than the table value (X-tab), which was 3.841 at 0.05 level of significance. Therefore, the sex of civil servants is associated with the rate of corruption in the Sokoto State Civil Service. This result shows that corruption among the civil servants is influenced by their sex. Male civil servants are more likely to be corrupt compared with female civil servants in Sokoto state. The table also showed that corruption was low among 3.0% and high among 15.9% of the civil servants that were between the

ages of 18 and 27, corruption was low among 10.5% and high among 18.2% of the civil servants that were between the ages of 28 and 37, corruption was low among 3.0% and high among 22.6% of the civil servants that were between the ages of 38 and 47, corruption was low among 6.1% and high among 19.3% of the civil servants that were between the ages of 48 and 57, corruption was low among 0.7% and high among 0.7% of the civil servants that were between the ages of 58 and 65. There is statistically significant relationship between age and rate of corruption using the chi-square test tool because the calculated value (X-Cal), which was 17.082, was more than the table value (X-tab), which was 9.49 at 0.05 level of significance. Therefore, the age of civil servants is associated with the rate of corruption in the Sokoto State Civil Service. This result shows that corruption among the civil servants is influenced by their age. Civil servants between the ages of 30 and 47 in Sokoto state are more likely to be corrupt compared with those in other age groups. The table also showed that




Figure 2. Rate of corruption in Sokoto civil service.
Source: Field Survey, 2022.

Table 2. Demographic variables and corruption rating.

Sex	Rate of corruption			df	X-Cal	X-Tab	Sig
	Low (%)	High (%)	Total (%)				
Male	64(21.6)	143(48.3)	207(69.9)	1	22.285	3.84	0.000
Female	5(1.7)	84(28.4)	89(30.1)				
Total	69(23.3)	227(76.7)	296(100.0)				
Age				4	17.082	9.49	0.002
18-27	9(3.0)	47(15.9)	56(18.9)				
28-37	31(10.5)	54(18.2)	85(28.7)				
38-47	9(3.0)	67(22.6)	76(25.7)				
48-57	18(6.1)	57(19.3)	75(25.3)				
58-65	2(0.7)	2(0.7)	4(1.4)				
Total	69(23.3)	227(76.7)	296(100.0)				
Marital status				3	8.430	7.81	0.038
Single	3(1.0)	35(11.8)	38(12.8)				
Married	66(22.3)	185(62.5)	251(84.8)				
Divorce	0(0.0)	2(0.7)	2(0.7)				
Widow	0(0.0)	5(1.7)	5(1.7)				
Total	69(23.3)	227(76.7)	296(100.0)				
Family size				3	17.274	7.81	0.001
1-5	46(15.5)	95(32.1)	141(47.6)				
6-12	23(7.8)	104(35.1)	127(42.9)				
11-15	0(0.0)	10(3.4)	10(3.4)				
16 and above	0(0.0)	18(6.1)	18(6.1)				
Total	69(23.3)	227(76.7)	296(100.0)				

Source: Field Survey, 2022.

Table 3. Demographic variables and corruption rating.

Educational attainment	Rate of corruption			rho	Sig
	Low (%)	High (%)	Total (%)		
primary education	0(0.0)	3(1.0)	3(1.0)	0.146*	0.012
secondary education	0(0.0)	13(4.4)	13(4.4)		
tertiary education	63(21.3)	201(67.9)	264(89.2)		
other specify	6(2.0)	10(3.4)	16(5.4)		
Total	69(23.3)	227(76.7)	296(100.0)		
Income per month					
less than ₦32,222	0(0.0)	31(10.5)	31(10.5)	-0.192**	0.001
₦32,223 - ₦62,222	28(9.5)	79(26.7)	107(36.1)		
₦62,223 - ₦92,222	9(3.0)	70(23.6)	79(26.7)		
₦92,223 and above	32(10.8)	47(15.9)	79(26.7)		
Total	69(23.3)	227(76.7)	296(100.0)		

Source: Field Survey, 2022.

corruption was low among 1.0% and high among 11.8% of the single civil servants, corruption was low among 22.0% and high among 62.5% of the married civil servants, corruption was high among 0.7% and 1.7% of the divorced and widowed civil servants. There is a statistically significant relationship between marital status and rate of corruption using the chi-square test tool because the calculated value (X^2), which was 8.430, was more than the table value (X^2_{tab}), which was 7.81 at 0.05 level of significance. Therefore, the marital status of civil servants is associated with the rate of corruption in the Sokoto State Civil Service. This result shows that corruption among the civil servants is influenced by their marital status. Civil servants that are married in Sokoto state are more likely to be corrupt compared with those with other marital status. Also, corruption was low among 21.6% and high among 32.1% of the civil servants with a family size of between 1-5, corruption was low among 7.8% and high among 35.1% of the civil servants with a family size of between 6-12, corruption was high among 3.4 and 6.1% of the civil servants with family size between 11-15 and 16 and above respectively. There is a statistically significant relationship between family size and rate of corruption using the chi-square test tool because the calculated value (X^2), which was 17.274, was more than the table value (X^2_{tab}), which was 7.81 at 0.05 level of significance.

Therefore, the family size of civil servants is associated with the rate of corruption in the Sokoto State Civil Service. This result shows that corruption among the civil servants is influenced by their family size. Civil servants with a family size of between 6 and 12 are more likely to be corrupt compared with other servants in Sokoto state. Table 3 shows that corruption was high among 1.0% of the civil servants with primary education, high among 4.4% of the civil servants with secondary education, corruption was low among 21.3% and high

among 67.9% of the civil servants with tertiary education, corruption was low among 2.0% and high among 3.4% of the civil servants with other educational attainment. This result shows that corruption among the civil servants is influenced by their educational attainment. Civil servants with tertiary education attainment are more likely to be corrupt compared with other servants in Sokoto state. Also, $\rho = 0.146$ shows that there is a statistically significant relationship between education attainment and rate of corruption using the rho test tool. The result means that the relationship between the two variables is weak and the direction of the relationship is positive. Also, that corruption was high among 10.5% of the civil servants that earn less than ₦32,222, corruption was low among 9.5% and high among 26.7% of the civil servants that earn ₦32,223 - ₦62,222, corruption was low among 3.0% and high among 23.6% of the civil servants that earn ₦62,223 - ₦92,222, corruption was low among 10.8% and high among 15.9% of the civil servants that earn from ₦92,223 and above. This result shows that corruption among the civil servants is influenced by their income per month. Civil servants that earn between ₦32,223 - ₦62,222 are more likely to be corrupt compared with other civil servants in Sokoto state. Also, $\rho = -0.192^{**}$ shows that there is a statistically significant relationship between income per month and rate of corruption using the rho test tool. The result means that the relationship between the two variables is weak and the direction of the relationship is negative.

Hypothesis one

H_0 : Income per month does not have a negative effect on corruption

H_1 : Income per month has a negative effect on corruption

Table 4 shows the simple correlation between income per

Table 4. Model summary.

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	-0.204 ^a	0.042	0.038	0.960

a. Predictors: (Constant), rate of corruption

Source: Field Survey, 2022.

Table 5. ANOVA^a.

Model		Sum of squares	Df	Mean square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	11.792	1	11.792	12.800	0.000 ^b
	Residual	270.843	294	0.921		
	Total	282.635	295			

a. Dependent Variable: rate of corruption

b. Predictors: (Constant), Income per month

Source: Field Survey, 2022.

Table 6. Coefficients^a.

Model		Unstandardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	3.530	0.240		14.726	0.000
	Income per month	-0.472	0.132	-0.204	-3.578	0.000

a. Dependent Variable: rate of corruption

Source: Field Survey, 2022.

month and rate of corruption (ρ) of -0.204^a. The simple correlation result shows that the strength of the relationship between the two variables is weak and the direction of their relationship is negative. An adjusted R square of 0.031 in the result means that 3.1% of the negative change in the rate of corruption in Sokoto State Civil service was accounted for by the increase in income per month. Table 5 shows that the effect of the independent variable (income per month) on the dependent variable (rate of corruption) was significant at $F = (1, 294) = 12.800$; $p < 0.05$, which also means that our regression model effectively predicted the outcome. Table 6 reveals the contribution of the independent variables to the dependent variable, which is expressed in Beta weights and t-test. Income per month ($B = -0.472$, $t = -3.578(296)$, $p > 0.05$) negatively affects the rate of corruption. Hence, the null hypothesis is rejected which state that income per month does not have a negative effect on corruption while the alternative hypothesis is accepted which state that income per month has a negative effect on corruption.

DISCUSSION

The study found that using office facilities such as paper, vehicles, etc. to meet urgent personal needs is corruption

and this is the most common form of corruption in the Sokoto State Civil Service. This is a betrayal of the office's trust and, according to Hallak and Poisson (2007), is regarded as corruption. This finding is contrary to many studies that have identified bribery and salary fraud as the most common types of corruption in the civil service. For example, Dominik and Christina (2017) maintained that salaries of public officials may also be a factor to consider while analyzing the reasons of corruption. While others argued that variation of the efficiency-wage theory claims that higher public-sector wages deter corruption because of the high personal costs of arrest and expulsion from government employment or administration (Kligaard, 1997; Mookherjee, 1995; van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). Higher public-sector wages have also been recommended as a way to combat corruption by attracting more honest people to work for the government (Bond 2008). This form of corruption, which is prevalent in the Sokoto state civil service, is described by Johnston (2005) as "Grand Corruption." According to Hellman et al. (2000), this form of corruption is often an instrument for personal gain, which can lead to terribly distorted policies, thereby rendering them ineffective. This study found that corruption among civil servants is influenced by their sex.

In Sokoto state, male civil servants are more likely to be corrupt compared with female civil servants.

This finding is supported by the findings of Šumah (2018) that women are less susceptible to corruption than men. The study also found that corruption among civil servants is influenced by their age and that civil servants between the ages of 30 and 47 in Sokoto state are more likely to be corrupt compared with those in other age groups. The study found that corruption among civil servants is influenced by their marital status and that married civil servants in Sokoto state are more likely to be corrupt compared with those with other marital statuses. Also, the study found that corruption among civil servants is influenced by their family size. Civil servants with a family size of between 6 and 12 are more likely to be corrupt compared with other civil servants in Sokoto state. The study found that corruption among civil servants is influenced by their educational attainment and that most civil servants with tertiary education are more likely to be corrupt. The study found that corruption among civil servants is influenced by their income per month and that civil servants that earn between ₦32,223 - ₦62,222 are more likely to be corrupt compared with others. This is corroborated Dominik and Christina (2017) Salaries of public officials may also be a factor to consider while analyzing the reasons for corruption.

The study found that there is a statistically significant relationship between income per month and the rate of corruption, and that the higher the income, the lower the level of corruption in the state ministries. This finding is in line with the variation of the efficiency-wage theory that claims that higher public-sector wages deter corruption (van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001) in the same way Becker and Stigler's (1974) model supports the findings that greater incomes are associated with less corruption due to the consequences of wrongdoing. The value of many people lies in getting rich and driving exotic cars, which may be one of the reasons why many of them prefer to use the office car for personal use. Hence, if the value of the members of society or even civil servants is money and is given more priority than honesty and accountability, then corruption will be on the increase. However, if the salaries are substantially reviewed and increased to be on par with their counterparts in other countries of the world, the rate of corruption will be reduced.

Conclusion

Based on these findings, as discussed in the previous section, the study concludes that low wages have a strong negative effect on the level of corruption that is perpetrated in the Sokoto state civil service because it was discovered that those civil servants at the bottom of the salary scale are the most corrupt, and that the rate of corruption falls as they rise up the ladder, which means that the lower the wages, the higher the level of corruption and vice versa. This is so because the salary is not sufficient to cater for their large family sizes.

Recommendations

Since civil servants often engage in corruption by using office facilities (such as paper, vehicles, etc.) to meet their urgent personal needs, it is important to set up a system that will ensure accountability. It is against this background that the ministry needs to install CCTV cameras within and outside the offices and its premises to ensure that all activities of the civil servants are covered, captured, monitored and reported to an ethics committee that will be set up by the government independent of the ministry so that the civil servants will not be able to influence them and their decisions. Also, trackers should be put on some of the office equipment and even vehicles in just the same way many private organizations do so that there can be restrictions. Since the ministries are dominated by males, who are the main perpetrators of corruption in the civil service, the government therefore needs to strive to achieve gender balance by giving more preference to women during recruitment. In their surveillance, the ethics committee that is set up by the government needs to focus more on civil servants between the ages of 30 and 47 years old since civil servants within these age groups tend to be more corrupt due to the financial demands and responsibilities that set in at this stage of their lives. Since there are religious and ethnic grounds that permit marrying up to two wives, the state civil service needs to set a standard for the maximum and minimum numbers of wives that a civil servant at a certain level must have since it has been established that their marital status also influences them to perpetrate corruption. Political leaders should implement effective anticorruption strategies that include providing adequate salaries for civil servants, cutting red tape and unnecessary regulation, monitoring civil servants in vulnerable positions, and increasing the likelihood of detecting and punishing corrupt individuals. In the same vein, the civil service needs to review its rules of engagement and stipulate the maximum facility that a civil servant should have. Given the country's current economic hardship and inflation rate, this would go a long way toward preventing them from having large families that their salaries cannot effectively support, leading them to perpetuate corruption. Also, since the income that the civil servants are paid is commensurate with their educational status, and those civil servants that are less paid are the most corrupt, the state ministries need to review the salary scale of the civil servants upward given the current level of inflation and the current economic downturn so that those who earn low may earn almost the same thing as their counterparts in other countries.

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CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The authors have not declared any conflict of interests.

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Full Length Research Paper

Kenya's evolving recognition and non-recognition policy under moi: A case of China and Taiwan (1990-1998)

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This study delves into the transformation of Kenya's foreign policy with regard to recognition and non-recognition, with a particular focus on its handling of China and Taiwan during the period spanning 1990 to 1998. Historically, Kenya's recognition policy adhered to the conventional norm of emphasizing the recognition of sovereign states over specific governments, as exemplified by Dr. Njoroge Mungai's stance on General Idi Amin's regime in Uganda during the 1970s. Kenya staunchly upheld the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations while expecting reciprocation from the international community. However, following the conclusion of the Cold War, Kenya's recognition policy underwent a significant paradigm shift. This research embarks on a comprehensive analysis of Kenya's intricate diplomatic relationship with Taiwan during Lee Teng-hui's presidency within the context of China's One-China policy. It employs a qualitative examination of historical archives, official speeches, diplomatic correspondences, and scholarly literature to unravel the diplomatic maneuvers pursued by Taiwan and China. The research findings bring to light the multifaceted interplay of economic interests, political affiliations, and the overarching dynamics of global power that played pivotal roles in shaping Kenya's recognition decisions. This study not only provides a historical backdrop but also offers valuable insights with contemporary relevance, illuminating Taiwan's intricate diplomatic journey on the global stage. At its essence, this research grapples with a fundamental inquiry: What discernible criteria influenced the Moi administration's decisions regarding the recognition of states as legitimate international actors? In particular, why did the Moi administration choose not to recognize Taiwan? By addressing this inquiry, this study contributes to a nuanced comprehension of Kenya's recognition policies and their ramifications on the international landscape.

Key words: Recognition, non-recognition, foreign policy, legitimacy, governments.

INTRODUCTION

Kenya's historical trajectory, both economically and politically, reflects a fascinating evolution. Politically, Kenya achieved independence from British colonial rule

in 1963 and adopted a multi-party system. Economically, Kenya has transitioned from a predominantly agrarian economy to one that encompasses diverse sectors.

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It has experienced consistent economic growth, with agriculture, manufacturing, and services contributing significantly. In recent years, Kenya's technology industry, dubbed "Silicon Savannah," has gained global recognition. In the convoluted landscape of international relations, characterized by clashes of national identities and fluid political allegiances, few situations are as complex as the recognition status of Taiwan during the presidency of Lee Teng-hui in the context of China. The diplomatic struggle between Taiwan and China, intensified by the One-China policy, not only profoundly influenced the destinies of these two entities but reverberated on a global scale.

Previous scholarship has diligently explored the elaborate dynamics of China-Taiwan relations, particularly within the framework of the One-China policy. However, a significant gap remains in the literature regarding an analysis of the recognition and non-recognition policies pursued during Moi's presidency towards China and Taiwan. Within the framework of President Moi's administration, this paper scrutinizes Kenya's recognition and non-recognition policies pertaining to China and Taiwan. By scrutinizing variables such as economic interests, political alliances, and prevailing global trends, this study dissects the subtleties of Kenya's stance. The paper also examines the repercussions of international recognition of Taiwan over global decision-making processes.

Numerous scholars have probed into the factors influencing countries' decisions regarding recognition of Taiwan and "one China policy." While economic interests and political alignments have received considerable attention, there exists a compelling need to delve into regional considerations that molded recognition policies throughout the Moi era. The subsequent sections will meticulously examine the historical backdrop of Taiwan's recognition status during President Moi's tenure in Kenya (1990-1998). This study will delve into the theoretical foundations that underpin my analysis, present case studies of recognition decisions, and dissect the strategic approaches adopted by Taiwan to navigate the complicated challenges of recognition. My investigation will culminate in a reflection on the enduring impact of these policies and their far-reaching implications for contemporary relations between Taiwan and China.

Context

In the period from 1990 to 1998, marked by Lee Teng-hui's presidency in China, Taiwan's quest for international recognition became highly significant. This timeframe coincided with Kenya's "Moi era," and these parallel developments offer a unique context to explore recognition and non-recognition policies. During this period, Kenya's approach to international recognition was crystallized. Dr. Njoroge Mungai, the Foreign Affairs Minister, outlined Kenya's doctrine emphasizing the

recognition of effective governments over regimes. Kenya notably recognized Idi Amin's government as effective, which set the stage for its recognition policy (Munene, 1997a). The post-Cold War era brought transformative global events, including the fall of the Berlin Wall, symbolizing the end of the Cold War and reshaping international relations. In Eastern Europe, non-communist regimes emerged, notably the reunification of Germany. The dissolution of the USSR led to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

In Africa, SomaliLand declared independence, striving for international recognition. Somalia experienced turmoil after the fall of Siad Barre's regime, while Eritrea gained recognition as an independent state. In Sudan, Southern Sudan under SPLA's leadership sought international recognition for self-determination (Quashigah and Okafor, 1999). Across Africa, unpopular governments were ousted through revolutions or democratic elections, partly due to support from the East or West during the Cold War. Examples include Idi Amin in Uganda and Mobutu Sese Seko in former Zaire (DRC). Kenya's handling of the Zaire situation during this period, shifting from non-recognition to recognition after Kabila's victory, illustrates its emphasis on recognizing governments rather than individuals. Kenya had previously declined to invite Kabila for peace negotiations held in Nairobi on the grounds that Kabila was not a recognized Head of State. By then, Kenya's Foreign Minister, Mr. Kalonzo Musyoka, had emphasized that Kenya recognized governments rather than individuals (Sunday Nation, 1997).

Thesis statement

This paper conducts a detailed analysis of the substantial impact that President Moi's direct engagement in foreign policy development, coupled with his personal approach, had on Kenya's policies regarding recognition and non-recognition, as illustrated through the specific instances involving China and Taiwan during his leadership.

Research problem and objectives

This study endeavors to scrutinize the nuanced dynamics surrounding recognition and non-recognition policies during President Moi's tenure, with a particular emphasis on the labyrinthine relationship between Taiwan and China. More precisely, aims to investigate how Taiwan strategically pursued and preserved global recognition while simultaneously navigating China's diplomatic endeavors to isolate the island nation with reference to Post-Cold War Moi era especially (1990-1998).

Research question

At its essence, this research grapples with a fundamental inquiry: What were the distinctive criteria that influenced

the Moi administration's determinations pertaining to the recognition of states as legitimate actors on the international stage? In particular, what factors underpinned the Moi administration's decision to withhold recognition from Taiwan?

Significance of the study

This study delves into the dynamics of recognition and non-recognition policies during President Moi's tenure, offering a rigorous analysis of Taiwan's adept navigation of international diplomacy during this period. It provides valuable insights into the broader implications of recognition dynamics in global diplomacy. Beyond its academic relevance, this research is of substantial significance to scholars and the broader public as it enhances understanding of Kenya's recognition policy concerning China and Taiwan during the Moi era. The findings are a valuable resource for researchers investigating Kenya's recognition policy, enabling them to discern patterns and changes in Kenya's foreign policy across subsequent administrations following President Moi's leadership.

Justification of the study period 1990-1998

The study period from 1990 to 1998 is chosen grounded in a compelling rationale. It aims to fill a gap in scholarly literature concerning Kenya's foreign policy during President Moi's tenure, particularly in its interactions with China and Taiwan after the Cold War. During this time, President Moi primarily conveyed his foreign policy orally, resulting in limited written documentation. This scarcity of documentation raises scholarly concerns about the clarity and consistency of Kenya's foreign policy. The research's main objective is to rigorously examine Kenya's engagement with and recognition of foreign governments during these pivotal years, marked by global and African geopolitical transformations. Africa witnessed dynamic political changes with elections and movements towards self-determination. Recognizing a foreign government implies acknowledging state sovereignty, making it a challenge for international actors to alter this status, even after governmental changes Talmon (1988). With a dearth of comprehensive scholarly investigations in this specialized field, this study aims to provide a nuanced examination of Kenya's diplomatic interactions during President Moi's tenure, shedding light on the complexities of international recognition and its implications in the late 20th-century geopolitical landscape, particularly in Kenya's engagements with China and Taiwan.

China and Taiwan as a case study

Utilizing China and Taiwan as a case study is of significant importance in this study. These two entities

offer a unique context to examine recognition and non-recognition policies in international relations. China's global influence, as well as its historical rivalry with Taiwan, presents a complex diplomatic landscape. By examining Kenya's foreign policy towards these nations, the research can elucidate how a smaller nation navigates the dynamics of global politics and diplomatic relations. The case study approach allows for a focused analysis of Kenya's stance towards these two influential players, providing valuable insights into the broader implications of recognition policies and their impact on a country's foreign relations.

China and Taiwan have long been engaged in a diplomatic rivalry, each seeking international recognition and support. This competition influences the stance of countries like Kenya, which may have to choose between recognizing one or the other. Studying these two cases provides a lens through which to examine how Kenya navigated this diplomatic rivalry.

Over time, the recognition of China by many countries, including Kenya, has become the norm due to its significant global presence. Taiwan, on the other hand, maintains recognition from a limited number of nations. Analyzing these cases helps shed light on how Kenya's foreign policy adapted to shifts in international alliances.

The China-Taiwan issue is not unique to Kenya and has broader international implications. By delving into the nuances of Kenya's policies towards these two entities, this research can contribute to a broader understanding of how countries make foreign policy decisions in the context of complex international dynamics. Incorporating China and Taiwan as case studies enables a richer and more insightful analysis of Kenya's foreign policy choices and the broader geopolitical considerations at play especially after the Cold-War during Moi era.

Theoretical/Conceptual framework

This study finds its conceptual foundation in the circuitous interplay of diplomatic recognition, sovereignty, and the One-China policy. These fundamental concepts form the scaffolding through which we can conduct a complete analysis of the motives, tactics, and consequences inherent in the acts of both recognizing and withholding recognition from various entities during President Moi's tenure.

Diplomatic recognition stands as a cornerstone in international law, serving as the bedrock upon which international rights and responsibilities are established. It assumes a pivotal role in acknowledging the emergence of new states or governments. Within this realm, recognition carries a web of entitlements and obligations that can either bind or disentangle entities from the global community. The very essence of a state's existence is multifacetedly intertwined with recognition, marking its genesis as a legal entity and an active participant in the global arena. The domain of recognition is profoundly

significant and knotty, frequently susceptible to manipulation by various governments (Taylor, 1994).

A particularly salient predicament arises for states lacking representation within the United Nations Organization. Such states are vulnerable to non-recognition by influential powers and international actors, primarily due to the latter's veto authority, which empowers them to influence the admission of new members to the organization. In essence, "recognition" signifies the acknowledgment of a new entity within the international system, endowing it with an autonomous status within the existing global order, accompanied by corresponding rights and responsibilities (Satyavrata, 1964).

The recognition of a new government becomes relevant when a state, while remaining intact, experiences a significant change in leadership through a revolution or popular uprising, resulting in the transfer of power to a new entity or insurgent group (Shaw, 1997). Complexity arises when the non-recognition of such a government implies the non-recognition of the state itself, as the government serves as the representative of the state. In compliance with international law, recognition can be achieved through formal declarations, the establishment of legal relations, formal pronouncements, or state conduct (Satyavrata, 1964).

In their work, Dixon et al. (1991) underscore the significance of international recognition. They emphasize that it grants the ability to engage in treaty negotiations, seek membership in international organizations like the United Nations, and actively participate in the decision-making processes within these organizations. This principle finds its foundation in Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, dating back to 1933. It is essential to emphasize that while recognition of states and governments constitutes distinct concepts, they often operate in unison, particularly during the establishment of new states. Nonetheless, the primary focus here centers on the recognition of one state's government by one or more other states. In the realm of international relations, this process ensures that only regimes deserving of such status are acknowledged as the legitimate governments of states. Moreover, it serves to inform courts, government agencies, and the citizens of recognizing states that a specific regime genuinely constitutes the government of another state.

The complexities arising from the recognition of governments hold paramount importance within the sphere of international law, as they profoundly impact the sovereignty of the recognized state. When international actors decline to acknowledge a government, they effectively withhold numerous advantages provided by international law from the community governed by that government. This may encompass the refusal to validate its legislative and judicial actions, as well as the denial of ordinary jurisdictional immunities to the government and its organs. Such a refusal to recognize a government can

place the international actor in a precarious position, potentially impeding its ability to protect its citizens and interests within the territory governed by the unacknowledged government.

As articulated by Professor Hyde in Moore and Rivier, recognition guarantees the new state (if it is the subject of recognition) that it will be acknowledged as an independent political entity on the international stage, preserving its position and standing within the community of nations (International Law I. 56). However, it is imperative to note that this definition predominantly pertains to a state's international legal persona. Consequently, recognition harmonizes with the principles of international law (Satyavrata, 1964).

In a seminar paper dated 1997, Makumi Mwangi conducted a survey of Kenya's recognition policy during and after the Cold War era, with the intention of elucidating the rationale behind it. Mwangi observed a shift in recognition policy, transitioning from recognizing entire states to recognizing specific regimes. He endeavored to trace the diplomatic endeavors that instigated this abrupt policy transformation. Consequently, the seminar paper leaves us with a lingering inquiry: Does Kenya's recognition policy exhibit consistent trends regarding the legitimacy of governments (Mwangi, 1997)?

Overall, this theoretical framework sets the stage for a wide-ranging analysis of Kenya's recognition policies in the context of the One-China policy, contributing to a nuanced understanding of the complex diplomatic dynamics during President Moi's administration.

METHODOLOGY

This study employs a qualitative research approach, integrating archival analysis and an exhaustive review of official documents, speeches, and statements pertaining to Kenya's foreign policy in relation to China and Taiwan. This triangulation of sources, supplemented by an examination of global events and regional dynamics, aims to elucidate the discernible patterns, shifts, and trends in Kenya's policies of recognition and non-recognition during the specified time frame. Furthermore, this research incorporates case studies, using China and Taiwan as illustrative examples to deepen the analytical insights.

The focus of this study is the foreign policy of President Moi from 1978 to 1998. It draws primarily from secondary sources such as the *Weekly Review*, speeches, seminar papers, and peer-reviewed articles. In a supplementary capacity, a limited number of personal statements have been gathered through direct communication with individuals associated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the *Nation* newspaper.

To conduct an analysis of recognition and non-recognition policies, a qualitative assessment was performed on a diverse array of historical documents, official speeches, magazines, weekly publications, newspapers, books, and journals, in conjunction with pertinent scholarly literature. This holistic approach, encompassing both primary and secondary sources, is designed to shed light on the dynamics of diplomatic landscape that influenced Taiwan's pursuit of international recognition. Consequently, a qualitative research design was selected, as it enables an in-depth exploration of diplomatic materials, official speeches, and historical records

originating from both China and Taiwan.

Scope and limitations

This study endeavors to offer an analysis of the dynamics of recognition during President Moi's tenure. However, it is imperative to acknowledge the inherent limitations associated with historical research. Some documents remained inaccessible due to their classified nature and the mazelike nature of international relations during the era. This presented considerable hurdles in deciphering diplomatic subtleties.

Also, despite diligent efforts to maintain objectivity in my arguments and critiques, there were instances where inadvertent personal biases may have influenced the discourse. Additionally, temporal limitations played a pivotal role in shaping the study's parameters. Challenges emerged when attempting to glean profound insights from individuals within foreign affairs offices and conducting interviews, as there was a reticence to delve into sensitive governmental matters, particularly those related to President Moi.

Furthermore, the inability to conduct interviews with certain key figures, due to constraints in time and governmental policies that imposed restrictions on interactions with non-governmental individuals, presented a substantial hurdle in the execution of this study. Additionally, President Moi predominantly communicated his foreign policy orally, primarily through impromptu speeches, resulting in a dearth of written documentation. This paucity of documentation raises scholarly concerns regarding the clarity and consistency of Kenya's foreign policy.

Overall, the research methodology is well-conceived, and the acknowledgment of limitations demonstrates a realistic approach to the study. The chosen methods and sources align with the research objectives, making it a promising approach to uncovering the dynamics of recognition policies during President Moi's tenure.

LITERATURE REVIEW

President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya

This text provides a historical overview of Daniel Toroitich arap Moi, Kenya's second President, and touches on some key events and policies during his tenure in relation to his foreign policy. Moi's foreign policy can be characterized as one that initially aligned with the pro-Western stance of his predecessor during the Cold War era. However, it evolved in response to changing global dynamics, with a shift towards multipartyism and democratic reforms in the early 1990s. His commitment to peaceful transitions of power and diplomacy in Africa contributed to Kenya's foreign relations and regional stability.

Daniel Toroitich arap Moi, the second President of Kenya, came into office in 1978 following the passing of Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya's first President. His ascension to power was constitutional due to his position as Vice President at the time. Born on September 2, 1924, in Kuriengwo, Moi belonged to the Tugen sub-group of the Kalenjin community in the Kenyan Rift Valley (McKenna, 2020). His presidency, from 1978 to 2002, is the second-longest in Kenya's history.

One significant event during Moi's presidency was the thwarting of a coup attempt on August 1, 1982, led by Air Force personnel and university students. Military and police forces, under the leadership of Chief of General Staff Mohamoud Mohamed, decisively suppressed the coup (Nyamora, 1992), leading to the sentencing to death of those involved (Ndunda, 2016).

Moi initially followed the pro-Western policies of his predecessor, Jomo Kenyatta, during the Cold War era, attracting substantial development aid and elevating Kenya's status as a prosperous

African nation. However, changes unfolded in the early 1990s as the Cold War ended, oil prices surged, and agricultural commodity prices in Africa declined. Simultaneously, Western engagement with Kenya transformed amid concerns about communist influences from Ethiopia and Tanzania.

Despite Kenya's one-party state status since independence in 1963, Moi responded to Western calls for political and economic reforms in the late 1990s by legalizing opposition parties in 1991. This was a notable shift from his previous stance, further emphasized when he announced his intent to repeal Section 2(A) of the constitution, opening the way for multipartyism during a KANU conference in December 1991 (Throup and Hornsby, 1998).

The 1992 and 1997 elections were marred by allegations of electoral fraud and violence, particularly affecting the Kikuyu community. Moi won both elections, serving a total of five terms. However, his eligibility for the 2002 presidential elections faced restrictions. Instead of seeking a third term, Moi endorsed Uhuru Kenyatta, Kenya's first President's son, leading to the formation of the National Rainbow Coalition and the victory of Mwai Kibaki in the 2002 elections (Lacey, 2002).

After leaving office in December 2002, Moi's political influence waned, although he remained popular. He returned to the public eye in 2007 when appointed as a special peace envoy to Sudan, leveraging his expertise in African affairs to facilitate a peace agreement in southern Sudan (Hull, 2007).

Moi's health deteriorated over time, with a dementia diagnosis in August 2017 (Kahawatungu, 2017), and hospitalization in October 2019 due to complications related to pleural effusion (Mphaso, 2019). He passed away on February 4, 2020, with his age being a matter of dispute his family claiming he was 105 though the government stated he was 95 years (Standard Digital, 2020). A state funeral was held in his honor, and he was laid to rest at his Karabak home in Nakuru County alongside his former wife, Lena Bomett (BBC News, February 11, 2020).

Development of Kenya's recognition policy

Contextualizing recognition in the cold war era

Within the tangled landscape of the Cold War, Kenya's approach to recognition policy mirrored wider global trends. Like many nations, Kenya adhered to the Estrada Doctrine, a framework advocating the automatic recognition of governments without regard to specific circumstances (Jessup, 1931). This doctrine sought to establish a clear-cut benchmark for recognition that often-bypassed political considerations and state exigencies. Nonetheless, it faced criticism for blurring the distinction between recognition and the maintenance of diplomatic relations. Furthermore, its applicability was a subject of dispute when confronted with situations involving competing governments.

Alternative perspectives- The Tobar doctrine

In stark contrast to the Estrada Doctrine, the Tobar Doctrine, also known as the Doctrine of Legitimacy (Stansifer, 1967), posits that governments that come to power through extra-constitutional means should not receive recognition until such changes gain the acceptance of the populace. Essentially, the Tobar Doctrine advocates for non-recognition in revolutionary contexts, although its alignment with political realities and considerations has historically been precarious (Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations).

As the circuitous dynamics of recognition policies and non-recognition stances unfolded during the late 20th century, notable cases, such as those involving China and Taiwan between 1990 and 1998, stand as compelling examples for in-depth examination. Delving into the complexities of these cases will shed light on the

nuanced factors influencing recognition decisions, providing insights into the broader international dynamics of that era.

Rationale and evolution of recognition policy

As previously mentioned, Kenya, following a pattern observed in many nations, and adopted a policy of selective recognition during President Moi's tenure. This strategic choice aimed to mitigate potential conflicts arising from the act of recognizing governments. This policy allowed Kenya to openly acknowledge governments it might otherwise have abstained from recognizing (Galloway, as cited in op. cit., p. 142).

In the initial years, the direction of Kenya's recognition policy remained unclear due to the absence of a well-defined tradition or established pattern of interests. Howell (1968) identified two distinct strands within Kenya's foreign policy: a conservative strand and a radical one. The conservative approach revolved around maintaining the regional status quo that existed before independence, thereby preserving Kenya's dominant role in Eastern Africa. Conversely, the radical strand manifested itself internationally through non-alignment, reflecting the newly independent state's assertion of sovereignty. It is essential to note, however, that Kenya's non-alignment coexisted with clandestine engagements with the South African regime.

Furthermore, the principle of non-alignment, integral to Kenya's foreign policy, was grounded in self-determination and respect for the territorial integrity of other states, as evident in the charters of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations (UN) (Olatunde et al., 1985).

Overall, the text provides insights into the complexity of international recognition policies and the diverse approaches that nations may adopt. It also touches on the historical and geopolitical context in which these policies evolve. This information is relevant for understanding the intricacies of international diplomacy and the considerations that underpin decisions related to recognizing governments.

International actors

Influence of the organization of African Unity (OAU) on Kenya's foreign policy

This section provides a profound understanding of how the Organization of African Unity (OAU) played a pivotal role in shaping Kenya's recognition policy after gaining independence. It highlights the ever-evolving global landscape and the complex challenges faced by newly sovereign African nations. The OAU significantly influenced Kenya's approach to recognition, carefully navigating the recognition of governments while upholding the principle of non-interference. It showcases the OAU's role as a platform for African nations to address emerging challenges and promote stability across the continent. Furthermore, it underscores the formidable dilemmas faced by leaders like Daniel arap Moi, who had to grapple with mediating conflicts in other African regions while simultaneously managing domestic crises.

Kenya's foreign policy has been significantly molded by international factors and actors. Within the context of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Kenya's recognition policy, as articulated in its foreign policy, has experienced a noticeable transformation since gaining independence. This transformation has been influenced by the ever-changing dynamics within the global arena.

After attaining independence, Kenya eagerly embraced OAU membership, aligning itself with the fundamental principles enshrined in the OAU Charter. The initial version of this Charter encouraged member states to contribute to a fund aimed at

supporting nations still in their quest for independence, providing assistance during their struggles for liberation (Worrall, 1982).

However, the initial euphoria accompanying the attainment of independence in many African nations often proved short-lived. It swiftly became apparent that numerous newly independent states were vulnerable to coups and the emergence of military regimes. This introduced a novel and complex challenge for both the OAU and regional governments. In response, the OAU promptly embarked on a strategic reassessment, culminating in the establishment of a Conflict Management Department tasked with addressing this emerging trend. Despite these endeavors, the proliferation of states governed by extra-constitutional means imposed a substantial burden on the OAU (Muyangwa and Vogt, 2000).

This conundrum prompted a significant debate on the recognition of such regimes, accompanied by apprehensions that such recognition could potentially inspire other states to pursue a similar path. Kenya, alongside other nations, opted to uphold its policy of recognizing states rather than governments. Nonetheless, this stance brought its own set of challenges. Firstly, states lacking international recognition often found themselves isolated from the global community. Secondly, non-recognizing states faced the risk of missing out on crucial bilateral trade opportunities with these unrecognized entities, which might possess valuable resources. Thirdly, the consideration of national interest emerged, raising questions about the potential repercussions of such actions.

During this era of uncertainty, Daniel arap Moi assumed leadership in Kenya. Despite the complexities, Kenya remained steadfast in adhering to its principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations. It is within this context that Kenya established diplomatic ties with military regimes, most notably in its dealings with the oppressive Idi Amin regime in Uganda.

Ironically, just four years later, in 1981, Moi assumed the role of Chairman of the OAU. Among his initial challenges in this capacity was the pressing need to address conflicts in various African regions, encompassing Chad, Western Sahara, apartheid-era South Africa, Namibia, Sudan, Angola, and Mozambique. However, even as Moi sought resolutions to conflicts elsewhere in Africa, domestic affairs in Kenya were spiraling out of control. In 1982, the Kenyan Air Force launched an unsuccessful coup attempt against Moi regime (Nyamora, 1992), thrusting Moi into a challenging role as a mediator and peacemaker.

Role of the United States in international affairs

The following section discusses the role of the United States in international affairs, particularly regarding Taiwan and China. While this section may not delve directly into Moi's specific actions, it provides critical background information and a broader international context that influenced Kenya's foreign policy choices during his presidency. It serves as a foundational piece in understanding the complexities of Kenya's recognition and non-recognition policies in the global arena.

Despite the limited scholarly attention accorded to Kenya's foreign policy during this era, especially in relation to South Africa, this study serves to elucidate the complicated dimensions of recognition within the realm of global politics. Drawing upon the foundational American doctrine articulated by U.S. Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson in 1793, which underscored a nation's entitlement to self-governance and the prerogative to conduct its foreign affairs according to its own volition, this paper delves into the ramifications of recognition within the context of international relations.

Historically, the United States' recognition policy mandated that governments demonstrate adherence to international obligations as a prerequisite for diplomatic recognition. However, it was President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points speech to Congress on January

8, 1918, that introduced a novel criterion emphasizing the necessity for governments to be established through constitutional procedures and to respect the will of the people (Throntveit, 2011). Wilson's concept marked a significant shift in international diplomacy, emphasizing the importance of governments being established through constitutional procedures and respecting the will of the people. This principle transformed recognition into a diplomatic instrument, as exemplified by the sixteen-year non-recognition of the Soviet Union.

U.S. policy towards Taiwan

During this period, the U.S. extended support to China's sovereignty claims over Taiwan while adhering to the One-China policy. This entailed diplomatic recognition and the absence of formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Concurrently, the U.S. engaged in arms sales to Taiwan under the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act, thereby maintaining unofficial relations and offering support for Taiwan's defense capabilities. Periodic diplomatic tensions between the U.S. and China, stemming from arms sales to Taiwan and other issues, were managed with a delicate equilibrium in their bilateral relations. Although formal diplomatic ties were absent, the United States maintained a robust relationship with Taiwan, particularly in the domains of trade, security, and the promotion of democratic values.

Evolution of Kenya's foreign policy towards china and Taiwan under moi

The era spanning from 1978 to 1998 marked a significant transformation in Kenya's foreign policy landscape, coinciding with the presidency of Daniel arap Moi. Following the passing of Kenya's founding father, President Kenyatta, in August 1978, Moi assumed office as the second president. While Moi aimed to uphold the principles of his predecessor's "Nyayo philosophy," his approach to recognition policy exhibited periodic shifts in response to changing domestic and international circumstances (Adar and Munyae, 2001). More especially when it comes to China and Taiwan changing trends.

China's diplomatic leverage

To comprehend Moi's influence, this paper delves into Kenya's recognition and non-recognition policies regarding China and Taiwan. The dichotomy between Kenya's relationship with China, bolstered by Moi's proactive diplomacy, and the non-recognition of Taiwan exemplifies the president's pivotal role in shaping foreign policy. Existing literature has underscored China's significant diplomatic leverage in swaying recognition decisions by other nations. This underscores the necessity of scrutinizing how Taiwan, in its efforts to counterbalance China's influence, adopted nuanced diplomatic strategies.

Consequences and their broader implications

My literature review exposes notable disparities in foreign policy formulation under Presidents Kenyatta and Moi. Kenyatta's approach was marked by caution, with State House retaining exclusive authority over foreign policy decisions. In contrast, Moi's leadership witnessed a shift towards a more personalized diplomacy, frequently involving the President deeply in foreign policy management. This occasionally led to the marginalization of relevant institutions in the policy-making process (Adar and Munyae, 2001).

Determinants of foreign policy

Kenya's foreign policy was molded by multiple factors, including economic performance and internal opposition to the Moi regime. As the regional landscape evolved, particularly with the resolution of conflicts in Ethiopia, new dynamics emerged. This resulted in a recalibration towards a novel regional equilibrium, exemplified by the resolution of ethnic sub-nationalism-induced instability in Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In this evolving environment, Kenya's recognition policies had to consider the imperative of mediating internal conflicts across the region (Adar and Munyae, 2001).

Complex interplay of factors

This literature review emphasizes the complexity inherent in Moi's recognition and non-recognition policies. By exploring the sophisticated interplay between shifting regional dynamics, economic considerations, domestic opposition, and personal diplomacy, it seeks to provide a detailed understanding of the evolution of Kenya's foreign policy during the Moi era. Furthermore, by employing China and Taiwan as case studies, this research endeavors to illuminate how these detailed factors influenced Kenya's stance on recognition and non-recognition.

Moi's transformation of foreign policy

Moi's distinct approach marked a departure from his predecessor's practice of delegating foreign policy decisions. He not only cherished international summits but also engaged in foreign policy discourse during his political rallies (Musambayi, 1995). A remarkable shift emerged as Moi moved the foreign policy office from Harambee Avenue to the President's office at Harambee House, signifying his central role in policy formulation. However, this centralized approach led to the personalization of foreign policy, as underscored by Dr. Robert Ouko, the late Minister of Foreign Affairs, who recognized Moi as the "chief architect of Kenya's foreign policy" (Oketch, 2013).

Complexities and drawbacks of singular leadership

While Moi's engagement demonstrated his commitment, the complexity of foreign policy required broader participation. Relying heavily on one individual yielded consequence, often leading Kenya to prioritize principles over long-term commitments. This one-man style left the country susceptible to potential shortcomings.

Shift in foreign policy: The Democratic Republic of Congo case

A compelling illustration of President Moi's influential role lay in the sudden transformation of Kenya's foreign policy towards the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly known as Zaire). This abrupt shift, emblematic of Moi's personal influence, underscores the imperative need for holistic deliberation before embarking on policy shifts of such substantial magnitude.

In his work titled "Conflict in Contemporary Africa" (2000), specifically in Chapter 14, Makumi Mwagiru argues that Kenya's handling of the Zaire conflict exposed a lack of diplomatic maturity in addressing regional conflicts at that time. Despite being unforeseen, it became apparent that Kenya was caught off guard by the unfolding events in Zaire. Rather than proactively engaging, Kenya found itself reacting, trailing events as they occurred and struggling to adapt swiftly to the dynamic and volatile situation in Zaire (Mwagiru, 2000).

In 1997, the civil war in Zaire, which pitted rebels led by Mr.

Laurent Kabila against government forces under President Mobutu Sese Seko, reached its zenith. President Moi convened a summit in Nairobi to address the deteriorating situation in Zaire. Remarkably, President Mobutu attended the summit before his ouster, even though he had not been officially invited as he was not recognized as a Head of Government internationally (The Daily Nation, March 7, 1997). Kenya's government had previously aligned itself with the Mobutu regime, implicitly placing blame on Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda for the crisis in Zaire. Ultimately, President Moi found himself aligning with the faction that would eventually lose in the conflict. When Kabila took control of Kinshasa in May 1997, Mobutu departed Kinshasa, taking with him the old name of the country, Zaire. By renaming it the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kabila signaled a new era. Governments across the continent rushed to recognize Kabila's government, even before it was formally established. The Organization of African Unity initiated this recognition, and soon afterward, messages of direct or implied recognition began pouring in from around the world (Weekly Review, May 16, 1997).

Subsequently, Moi handed over the chairmanship of the Great Lakes conflict to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations (UN) in Lome, Togo. The responsibility for the peace initiative was later transferred to then South African President Nelson Mandela, who initiated clandestine talks with Kabila. These pivotal discussions were immortalized in a photograph capturing Kabila and Mandela during their secret meeting, marking Kabila's first international recognition. Notably, South Africa and Kenya were among the first countries to embrace the new regime in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Weekly Review, May 16, 1997).

Kenya's relations with China/Taiwan in the post-cold war era (1990-1998)

Historical context

The historical dynamics between China and Taiwan have been sinuous and enduring. The roots of their relationship trace back to the earliest known inhabitants of Taiwan, believed to have migrated from southern China. In AD 239, Chinese historical records documented the island's existence when an imperial expedition ventured into the region, laying the foundation for China's territorial claims over Taiwan. Despite a brief period as a Dutch colony from 1624 to 1661, Taiwan remained under the dominion of China's Qing dynasty from 1683 to 1895 (BBC, 2021). Subsequently, a substantial influx of Chinese immigrants, primarily Hoklo Chinese from Fujian and Hakka Chinese from Guangdong, reshaped Taiwan's demographics (BBC, 2021).

Post-cold war era (1990-1998)

The post-Cold War period from 1990 to 1998 marked a significant juncture in Kenya's foreign policy toward China, characterized by evolving geopolitical and economic considerations. This phase witnessed the transformation of Kenya's diplomatic relationships with both China and Taiwan, characterized by enhanced economic collaboration, bilateral trade, and shifts in international recognition. This was a time of burgeoning amicability and collaboration between Kenya and China; particularly Moi's stance on recognizing or not recognizing China and Taiwan.

Diplomatic ties and economic partnerships

Upon assuming office in 1978, President Moi initiated a discernible shift towards forging closer ties with China. This transformation was underscored by the establishment of diplomatic relations and the subsequent fostering of economic cooperation. Moi actively

encouraged Chinese investments and bilateral trade, resulting in financial aid, infrastructure development projects, and technical assistance spanning multiple sectors, including transportation, industry, energy, and telecommunications. Furthermore, social and cultural exchanges flourished, fostering mutual understanding and cooperation (Cheng-Yi, 2000).

Defense infrastructure and expenditure

The formal presence of US military bases in Taiwan concluded in 1979, coinciding with the United States' shift in diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. Nonetheless, a small contingent of the US military personnel continues to maintain a presence in Taiwan (Ripley et al., 2021). Although there are no formal treaties binding the US and Taiwan, both the United States and Japan have publicly affirmed their commitment to defending Taiwan.

Kenya's position on the Taiwan question

The tenure of President Lee Teng-hui (1990-1998) in Taiwan marked a crucial period of significant international developments and evolving relations with China. Central to this diplomatic landscape was the One-China policy, which played a pivotal role. Analyzing Taiwan's endeavors to secure and maintain international recognition, despite opposition from China, warrants an extensive exploration (Lin, 2000).

President Moi, known for his commitment to strengthening Taiwan's democratic institutions and advocating for international recognition, adopted a cautious and strategic stance on the Taiwan issue. Despite Taiwan's economic prosperity, Kenya chose to downplay its ties with the island to solidify its relationship with China. This approach was exemplified in statements by Kenyan officials, such as Mr. Musalia Mudavadi, who downplayed the presence of Taiwanese enterprises in the country. Kenya's position mirrored that of several nations, including the United States, which prioritized the "One China" policy to avoid antagonizing the mainland Chinese government (People's Daily Online).

African perspectives: South Africa's dual recognition challenge

Beyond Kenya, South Africa's engagement with Taiwan and China presents a compelling case study. President Nelson Mandela's historical connections with Taiwan, including financial support to the African National Congress, exemplify the knotty nuances of international relations. However, South Africa's delicate balancing act between these two influential powers ultimately led to an unexpected decision to exclusively recognize Beijing. This shift represented a significant departure from its previous stance and underscored the influence of geopolitical considerations (McNeil Jr., 1996).

Moi's foreign policy towards China during the years 1990-1998 reflected a dynamic interplay of economic cooperation, diplomatic considerations, and global politics. The contrasting cases of Kenya and South Africa demonstrated the challenges nations faced in navigating recognition and non-recognition policies concerning China and Taiwan. By analyzing these case studies, we gain a deeper understanding of the complex choices and negotiations that shape international relations.

Key figures shaping moi's foreign policy

Historical context

During the era of Kenyatta, discussing Kenya's foreign policy

inevitably involves considering the roles played by influential personalities such as James Gichuru, Njoroge Mungai, Peter Mbiyu Koinange, Joseph Murumbi, and Charles Mugane Njonjo. These individuals significantly contributed to the formulation and execution of Kenya's foreign policy during that period (Musambayi, 1995).

Continuity into Moi's government

Foreign policy formulation continued to be shaped by figures like Dr. Njoroge Mungai, Charles Njonjo, and Mbiyu Koinange even after Kenyatta's passing in 1978. Charles Njonjo, in particular, retained his influential position in Moi's new government, and his assistance in securing Moi's presidency showcased his enduring power. Despite the gradual departure of his colleagues from the Kenyatta era, Njonjo's influence remained significant (Musambayi, 1995).

During Kenyatta's tenure, Njonjo attempted to shift Kenya's recognition policy by advocating for recognition of the Boer regime in South Africa. However, Mr. Muniyua Waiyaki, the then foreign affairs minister, vehemently opposed this change. This clash of perspectives led to the continuation of Kenya's non-recognition policy toward the Boer regime. Despite this official stance, unofficial engagements still transpired (Munene, 1997b).

Njonjo's influence and role

Njonjo wielded substantial power, even extending his influence to bodies like the criminal investigation department. As the Attorney General, his impact on appointments within the judiciary and his role in facilitating a smooth transition from President Kenyatta to Moi were notable. Njonjo's departure from the Attorney General's office marked a challenging period of adjustment for both the nation and the office itself (Weekly Review, July 22, 1983). After Njonjo's downfall in 1983, Kenya underwent a transition from the "Njonjo era" to a post-Njonjo era. This period brought about changes in power dynamics and marked shifts in Kenya's foreign policy landscape.

Njonjo's successor: Nicholas Kipyatur arap Biwott

Mr. Nicholas Kipyatur Kiprono arap Biwott emerged as a significant figure after Njonjo. Biwott held the role of the president's trusted advisor, strategist, confidant, and business partner. Despite his power and influence, Biwott's legacy was tainted by allegations of mystery, scandals, and corruption. He was even rumored to be involved in the demise of Dr. Robert Ouko, the former foreign affairs minister (Weekly Review, May 7, 1993).

Dr. Robert Ouko's mysterious death

In February 1990, Dr. Robert Ouko, the then minister for foreign affairs and international co-operation, tragically passed away under mysterious circumstances. His body was discovered burnt a few kilometers away from his home. Moi expressed deep sorrow over his death and praised his contributions to Kenya's foreign affairs. Notably, Dr. Ouko's death followed his return from a visit to the US with President Moi (Weekly Review, December 1, 1995).

The United States embassy's gesture of flying their flags at half-mast in honor of Dr. Ouko was remarkable, as it is unusual for a foreign country to pay such respect to a non-head-of-state individual. This contrasted with the Kenyan government's response (Weekly Review, August 16, 1991).

This text provides a historical overview of key figures who influenced Kenya's foreign policy, with a focus on their roles and the

continuity of their influence during the transition from Kenyatta to Moi's leadership. It also introduces the complexities and controversies associated with figures like Njonjo and Biwott and touches on the mysterious circumstances surrounding Dr. Robert Ouko's death. This historical context adds depth to the understanding of Kenya's foreign policy during this period.

Moi's predecessors: foreign policy continuity and discontinuity situations

A look at Kenya's foreign policy evolution reveals a long-standing commitment to the "one China policy," recognizing Taiwan as part of the People's Republic of China. This policy has been consistent through the tenures of Presidents Moi, Kibaki, Uhuru, and Ruto. However, recent diplomatic interactions and shifting foreign policy approaches under President Ruto have introduced a degree of uncertainty regarding Kenya's commitment to the One-China principle. These developments add complexity to Kenya's stance on regions with unconventional international recognition, making it a topic of growing international interest and scrutiny.

President Mwai Emilio Kibaki (2002–2013)

In the initial phase of Kibaki's leadership (2002-2013), Western nations exerted significant diplomatic and economic influence across various African countries. However, they regularly reduced financial aid while advocating for democratic reforms. In response, Kenya, along with several other nations, opted to form alliances with nations like China, which pledged to uphold their sovereignty and abstain from meddling in their domestic affairs. Subsequently, Kibaki promptly launched a substantial economic pivot towards Asia with his "Look East Policy," a strategic initiative credited with effectively drawing Asian capital for a myriad of vital projects, encompassing the development of ports, highways, and airports (South China Morning Post, 2022).

His foreign affairs with China and Taiwan, Kibaki maintained a consistent "one-China policy," similar to his predecessor, President Daniel arap Moi. This policy aligned with Beijing's resolute stance, emphasizing the unshakable foundation of the one-China principle, which asserts Taiwan's historical ties to China dating back to 230 AD. President Kibaki's pivotal state visit to China in August 2005 had a primary focus on securing financial and technical support for Kenya's ambitious economic recovery plan.

This diplomatic effort resulted in cooperation agreements covering diverse areas, including infrastructure development, energy initiatives, and the expansion of air services between the two nations, as documented by Chege (2008). A notable achievement of this collaboration was the establishment of the Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway, a monumental project funded by the China Exim Bank and executed by China Road and Bridge Corporation, as reported by Kable (2017). The CNN Travel ranking also recognized the Mombasa-Nairobi Railway as one of the "20 Best Things to Experience in Kenya."

Additionally, the mutual designation of Kenya as an approved tourist destination by China stimulated an upsurge in Chinese tourism to Kenya. Furthermore, Kenya became home to two Confucius Institutes and served as a base for several Chinese state media headquarters, solidifying cultural exchange and media cooperation. These initiatives collectively reinforced the perception that Taiwan is an integral part of China, emphasizing China's preeminent role in the region and Taiwan's alignment with its jurisdiction.

However, there have been concerns due to the utilization of Chinese laborers on Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects, leading to potential displacement of local informal sector workers along project corridors and exacerbating poor working conditions.

Nonetheless, the surge in Chinese tourism presents economic opportunities for Kenya's hospitality and service sectors, while the presence of Confucius Institutes and Chinese media outlets underscores China's strategic efforts to enhance its cultural influence in Africa.

President Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (2013 to 2022)

Kenya's fourth President Uhuru Kenyatta's foreign policy toward China can be summed up as continuity with previous administrations "one china policy." This can be illustrated by an incident in April 2016, involving Taiwanese citizens in Kenya that brought the country into the center of a longstanding diplomatic dispute between China and Taiwan. The Kenyan government detained and subsequently deported a group of Taiwanese individuals to mainland China at China's request, citing their alleged involvement in a telecom fraud ring. This incident highlights Kenya's complex position in the crossfire of the China-Taiwan conflict, raising questions about its motivations and the diplomatic message it conveys. The dispute between China and Taiwan stems from a historical conflict that began in 1949, and despite economic cooperation, it remains a sensitive and unresolved issue. The deportation of Taiwanese citizens to China signifies a political move, potentially influenced by Kenya's diplomatic recognition of mainland China over Taiwan (Williams, 2016).

President William Samoei Ruto (2022-Present)

Kenya's fifth President, William Ruto, has adopted a foreign policy approach reminiscent of former President Daniel arap Moi, notably utilizing social media platforms, particularly Twitter, to communicate foreign policy matters. Ruto assumed office following a contentious national election on August 9, 2022.

This shift in foreign policy communication was exemplified when Ruto's tweet on September 14, 2022, declared that Kenya would no longer recognize the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), a territory in Western Sahara administered by the Polisario Front in exile in Algeria. Despite both SADR and Morocco being African Union members, Morocco has contested this territory since 1975 (The East African, 2022). However, Kenya's Foreign Ministry later clarified that it would maintain diplomatic relations with the SADR, retracting Ruto's tweet and expressing support for the SADR's right to self-determination, in alignment with the United Nations and African Union positions. It is worth noting that Kenya's historical support for the SADR, including hosting its embassy in Nairobi since 2014, adds complexity to this matter (Anadolu Agency, 2022).

President Ruto's foreign policy approach diverges from his initial alignment with Western nations, as demonstrated by his visit to China on October 14, 2023. This visit coincided with the 10th-anniversary conference of the Belt and Road Initiative, focusing on infrastructure development, trade, investment, the digital economy, and Kenya's growing debt concerns, largely stemming from Chinese loans funding essential infrastructure projects (The Standard, 2023).

The intricate issue of Taiwan plays a significant role in this visit, as China aims to strengthen its influence in Kenya and secure pivotal agreements. Kenya officially adheres to the One-China policy, recognizing Taiwan as an integral part of the People's Republic of China. However, recent diplomatic interactions between Kenyan officials and representatives from Taiwan, Kosovo, and Somaliland have raised questions about Kenya's stance on regions lacking conventional international recognition (The Standard, 2023).

In contrast to Kenya's stance on Taiwan, the country has recognized Kosovo passports and even appointed an ambassador to Somaliland, a self-declared autonomous region in northern Somalia seeking global recognition as an independent sovereign

state. These diplomatic moves have generated tensions and raised concerns about Kenya's consistency in its foreign policy toward regions that deviate from the standard norms of international recognition (The Standard, 2023).

Somaliland's quest for recognition is intricately connected with the broader international dynamics related to Taiwan. China vigorously upholds the One-China policy and views Taiwan as an inseparable part of China, striving for Taiwan's reunification with the mainland. Kenya's diplomatic interactions with regions like Somaliland and Taiwan have raised concerns within China about the continuity of Kenya's adherence to the One-China principle, even though Kenya lacks official relations with Taiwan. Moreover, the presence of the Taiwan Trade Centre in Nairobi adds to the complexity of the diplomatic landscape (The Standard, 2023).

President Ruto's diplomatic efforts, particularly regarding regions without traditional international recognition, will undergo close scrutiny by Western capitals as China intensifies its influence in Kenya. This complex diplomatic balancing act between Kenya and regions that deviate from established international norms adds a layer of complexity to the evolving dynamics of international diplomacy in the region.

The above text provides an analysis of Kenya's foreign policy evolution, highlighting the continuity of the "one China policy" while also shedding light on President Ruto's approach and the complexities of international diplomacy. It underscores the significance of Kenya's stance on regions with unconventional international recognition and the challenges it poses to its foreign policy.

FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

In the case study analyzing Kenya's recognition and non-recognition policy toward China and Taiwan during the Moi era (1990-1998), several significant findings and conclusions have emerged. This study sheds light on Kenya's complex diplomatic strategies, its evolving international relationships, and the implications for its foreign policy.

Dynamic diplomacy with pragmatic shifts

One of the key outcomes of the case study is the demonstration of Kenya's pragmatic approach to diplomatic recognition. During the Moi era, Kenya underwent a significant shift from recognizing Taiwan to recognizing the People's Republic of China. This transition, primarily driven by economic and geopolitical considerations, reflects Kenya's adaptability and pragmatism in international relations. The analysis highlights that Kenya was willing to realign its foreign policy in pursuit of economic benefits and international support.

Economic interests and bilateral relations

The study underscores the importance of economic interests in shaping Kenya's foreign policy decisions. The shift from recognizing Taiwan to embracing China as a strategic partner was motivated by the potential for

increased economic cooperation, trade opportunities, and financial aid. Kenya's interest in securing investments, development projects, and access to China's burgeoning market played a pivotal role in the reorientation of its foreign policy.

Implications for Africa's diplomatic landscape

This case study contributes to a broader understanding of how the recognition or non-recognition of China and Taiwan can impact African nations' diplomatic choices. As Kenya shifted allegiance from Taipei to Beijing, it demonstrated the influence China wields in the African continent and its ability to shape the diplomatic landscape. This underscores the importance of African countries navigating a complex web of international alliances and economic partnerships.

Non-recognition's implications for Taiwan

The case study highlights the diplomatic isolation faced by Taiwan as a result of non-recognition by Kenya and other countries in Africa. Kenya's shift to recognize China was not an isolated event but part of a broader trend on the continent. This emphasizes the diplomatic challenges that Taiwan faces in maintaining its global presence and securing international support.

Lessons for contemporary diplomacy

The evolving recognition and non-recognition policy in Kenya offers valuable insights for contemporary diplomacy. It illustrates the role of economic interests and geopolitical considerations in shaping diplomatic relations. Furthermore, it underscores the importance of African nations carefully balancing their interests and alliances to navigate the complexities of international diplomacy effectively.

In conclusion, the case study of Kenya's evolving recognition and non-recognition policy under President Moi provides a comprehensive analysis of the diplomatic choices made during a pivotal period in Kenya's history. It highlights the intricate interplay between economic interests, international relations, and the shifting dynamics of global politics. The lessons derived from this case study have broader implications for understanding the ever-evolving nature of diplomatic relationships in the international arena, with particular relevance to the African context.

DUSCUSSION

The study provides an analysis of recognition policies in the context of Taiwan's evolving identity during the Moi

era and offers valuable insights into Kenya's foreign policy continuity and change under subsequent presidents, including Kibaki, Uhuru, and Ruto. The use of a fusion of descriptive and analytical methodologies, including a diverse range of sources, demonstrates the rigor and depth of the research. This approach enables a nuanced understanding of the complex interplay between global diplomatic dynamics, recognition decisions, and the strategies adopted by Kenyan leaders.

The study underscores the multifaceted challenge posed by Taiwan's democratic accomplishments and evolving identity to China's One-China policy. During Moi's presidency, Kenya adhered to the One-China principle, recognizing Taiwan as part of the People's Republic of China. This policy continuity was largely maintained under subsequent administrations of Mwai Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta. However, President Ruto's diplomatic interactions with regions like Taiwan, Kosovo, and Somaliland suggest a potential shift in Kenya's foreign policy, raising questions about the continuity of its adherence to the One-China principle.

The study highlights the power dynamics inherent in global diplomacy, with China utilizing economic incentives to influence countries away from recognizing Taiwan. The examination of case studies reveals the intricacies of recognition decisions, influenced by economic interests and political alliances. Countries often navigate the complexities of maintaining relationships with both China and Taiwan while adhering to the parameters of the One-China policy.

The historical legacy of recognition and non-recognition policies during the Moi era continues to impact Taiwan's diplomatic landscape. This legacy shape Taiwan's engagement with international organizations and its ongoing quest for substantive global recognition.

In summary, the study provides a robust framework for analyzing Kenya's foreign policy evolution, especially in relation to China and Taiwan, under different presidential administrations. It sheds light on the delicate balance between diplomatic relationships, economic interests, and adherence to the One-China policy, offering a compelling exploration of the complexities of global diplomacy.

Conclusion

This paper delved into the sinuous realm of recognition and non-recognition policies under Moi's presidency, shedding light on the multifaceted dynamics that defined Taiwan's diplomatic efforts during this transformative era. Through an analysis of case studies, the delicate interplay of economic interests, political allegiances, and global power dynamics in shaping recognition decisions was revealed.

Kenya's foreign policy towards China during the post-Cold War era, particularly under the leadership of President Moi (1990-1998), was marked by a strategic

alignment with its own interests, deftly navigating the complex global landscape. This approach to foreign policy was characterized by pragmatism and a keen awareness of economic benefits. Throughout this period, Kenya's interactions with China were firmly rooted in its pursuit of economic advantages, often coinciding with China's aspirations for international recognition within the United Nations.

The examination of Kenya's recognition policy towards China under President Moi's administration, when viewed through the lens of International Law, has shed light on several critical dimensions. One significant aspect addressed in this study was the sensitive issue of Taiwan's legitimacy. In delving into the rationale for recognition, the study considered factors such as contextual circumstances, national interests, and the unique dynamics of the Post-Cold War era.

Furthermore, the study has elucidated how regional diplomatic shifts and the evolving global landscape necessitated Kenya's strategic realignment to avoid isolation. As the world underwent rapid transformations, Kenya's foreign policy adapted accordingly. The theoretical framework underpinning this study provided the essential structure for analyzing these nuanced shifts.

The importance of this research lies in its contribution to understanding the intricacies of Kenya's recognition policy and the subsequent evaluation of emerging strategies. The study meticulously examined the fluidity of regional and international policy landscapes and their impact on Kenya's foreign policy towards China. Notably, Kenya's recalibration of its recognition policy offered a fresh perspective on both regional and global affairs, infusing its foreign policy with renewed dynamism.

The guiding principle of any nation's foreign policy must be firmly grounded in reality rather than conjecture. President Moi's tenure exemplified this axiom through his foreign policy of good neighborliness, which cultivated robust relationships with various Asian nations. Over time, his approach towards Asia evolved in response to changing geopolitics, economic dynamics, and regional developments. Significantly, Moi's focus extended beyond economic ties, encompassing diplomatic relations, technological collaboration, and socio-economic progress. Moi's adept facilitation of an enabling environment for investments and partnerships contributed to enhanced economic cooperation with countries such as China, Japan, South Korea, and India. This collaboration was driven by the pursuit of advanced technology and expertise in sectors such as agriculture, infrastructure, and manufacturing. Simultaneously, Moi recognized the pivotal role of social development, fostering exchanges in education, culture, and healthcare. Through active efforts to secure technology transfer, scholarships, and cultural engagement, Moi's administration actively worked towards Kenya's economic advancement and comprehensive development.

To reiterate, Kenya's foreign policy under President Moi

vis-à-vis China encapsulated a pragmatic and self-interested approach, adeptly seizing opportunities for economic growth. This study has not only dissected the raveled layers of Kenya's recognition policy within the context of International Law but has also contextualized it within the broader dynamics of regional and global diplomacy. Through the lens of President Moi's engagement with Asian countries, particularly China, the study underscores the centrality of a tailored, reality-based foreign policy in advancing a nation's interests and fostering international collaboration.

Legacy and modern relevance

The legacy of recognition and non-recognition policies during President Moi's tenure continues to exert a profound influence on contemporary Taiwan-China relations. As Taiwan endeavors to affirm its identity and actively engage with the global community, the strategies employed during this period remain pertinent. The lessons derived from my analysis shed light on potential pathways for Taiwan's diplomacy in an ever-evolving global landscape.

Implications and recommendations of this study

The outcomes of this study bear significant implications that transcend the realm of Taiwan's recognition status. The research delves deeply into the strategies employed by Taiwan to navigate the complexities of recognition challenges, shedding light on the manner in which smaller states assert their sovereignty in intricate geopolitical scenarios. Furthermore, the analysis of China's diplomatic influence underscores the intricate dynamics of global diplomacy and the underpinning power dynamics.

The study's application of theoretical frameworks, including sovereignty and the One-China policy, provides valuable insights into the motivations and consequences associated with recognition dynamics. These concepts enrich our comprehension of how states grapple with recognition decisions, which often encompass not only political acknowledgment but also extend into domains involving economic partnerships and regional alliances.

Drawing from the analysis presented, a series of recommendations emerges to guide Kenya's foreign policy, particularly concerning China and Taiwan, amidst the evolving dynamics of recognition policy. These recommendations encompass maintaining a balanced approach that respects the One-China policy while upholding democratic values, ensuring clear and consistent communication to avoid mixed messaging, fostering collaboration with regional entities to coordinate recognition policies, conducting a thorough review of economic partnerships, engaging in long-term strategic

planning, promoting cultural and educational exchanges, offering diplomatic training, monitoring global developments, enhancing parliamentary oversight, and improving public diplomacy efforts.

These suggestions are intended to serve as a compass for Kenya, helping it uphold a balanced foreign policy stance, adapt to global shifts, and safeguard its interests while adhering to international norms and principles.

Future research directions

While this study offers an analysis of recognition dynamics during the Moi era, there exists room for further investigation into the evolving recognition landscape in the years following this period. Additionally, delving into the impact of recognition decisions on trade relations, international organizations, and regional stability could yield invaluable insights. Also, a follow-up of the future of China-Taiwan relations is invaluable.

Final reflection

In the scrutiny of recognition and non-recognition policies during the Moi era, a narrative of diplomatic intricacies, national identities, and global power dynamics have been unraveled. As Taiwan continues its journey on the global stage, the experiences of this era serve as a poignant reminder of the challenges and triumphs that mold the course of international relations and diplomacy. Recognizing the drawbacks of singular leadership, future foreign policy endeavors could benefit from a more inclusive approach. Public and parliamentary participation can serve as a safeguard against potential misalignments between foreign policy decisions and the interests of Kenyans.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

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